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COMMENT
BINS v. EXXON: AFFIRMATIVE DUTIES TO
DISCLOSE PROPOSED BENEFIT CHANGES IN THE
ABSENCE OF EMPLOYEE INQUIRY
Joseph E. Czemiawski*
INTRODU=rION
The Employee Retirement Income Securities Act of 1974
(ERISA)l was enacted amidst concern in Congress about reported
abuse and mismanagement of private pension plans.2 Prior to the en-
* Notre Dame Law Schoolj.D. Candidate, 2001; Franklin and larshall College,
BA. 1998. This Comment is dedicated to my parents, who gave me the faith, values,
and work ethic that are at the center of my life. I would like to thank Professor Gunn,
Ed Caspar, Christine Gould Hamm, Eric Hall, and Mike Chaplin for their comments
and assistance with this Comment. Thanks also to Professor Rice for all his help
throughout law school and to everyone involved in the Notre Dame Bengal Bouts.
1 Employee Retirement Income Securities Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1001-1461 (1994).
2 See id. § 1001 (a) (citing Congressional findings about the need to protect
promised pensions for employees); see alsoJeffrey A. Brauch, The Danger of Ignoring
Plain Meaning. Individual Rdeieffor Breach of Fiduciary Duty Under ERISA, 41 WxwE L
REV. 1233, 1237-38 (1995) (giving a general background of the legislative history of
ERISA). In discussing important events that led to comprehensive federal regulation
of private pension plans, Brauch recounts the closing of the Studebaker automobile
plant in South Bend, Indiana, which garnered tremendous publicity with the termina-
tion of its pension plan, which covered 11,000 workers. Se id. at 1238. The pension
plan was so underfunded that 4000 employees with vested pensions and ten years of
service received only fifteen cents on the dollar of their accrued benefits. See id.
(quotingJoHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE WuLK, PENsIoN AND KtPLOEE BFErr Lw 62
(2d ed. 1995)); see also H.R. REP. No. 93-807 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4670, 4676-77.
The statements in the "findings" section of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b), reflect
this congressional purpose:
[To protect.., the interests of participants in employee benefit plans and
their beneficiaries, by requiring the disclosure and reporting to participants
and beneficiaries of financial and other information with respect thereto, by
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actment of ERISA, pension and welfare benefit plans were subject to
the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act,5 which required sub-
stantial disclosure and imposed publication requirements for private
pension plans covering more than twenty-five employees. 4 While ER-
ISA also provides disclosure and publication requirements, it serves
the broader purpose of creating general fiduciary responsibilities
among those who administer pension and other welfare benefits. The
overall scheme of ERISA reflects a simple intent-to ensure that em-
ployees receive the pension and other benefits that they were prom-
ised. 6 While this broad goal of ERISA is made explicit in the text of
the statute,7 Congress also expressed the desire to encourage the de-
velopment of private pension plans, without placing an excessive bur-
den upon the system.8 This secondary goal of ERISA often seems
overshadowed in both the case law and legal commentary about fidu-
ciary duties under ERISA.9
This Comment examines the scope of duties owed by an ERISA
fiduciary, particularly in the disclosure of information about benefit
plan changes. In a recent en banc decision of the Ninth Circuit, Bins
v. Exxon Co.,10 the court reversed a panel decision that held that
establishing standards of conduct, responsibility, and obligation for fiducia-
ries of employee benefit plans, and by providing for appropriate remedies,
sanctions, and ready access to the Federal courts.
Id.
3 See Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act, Pub. L. No. 85-836, 72 Stat. 997
(1958), repealed by ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1975).
4 See Edward E. Bintz, Fiduciary Responsibility UnderERISA: Is There Ever a Fiduciary
Ddity to Disclose?, 54 U. Prrr. L. REV. 979, 985 n.21 (1993) (citing the provisions of the
Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act).
5 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
6 See Ryan P. Barry, Comment, ERJSA's Purpose: The Conveyance of Information from
Trustee to Benficiary, 31 CoNN. L. REV. 735, 735 (1999) (citing Welfare and Pension Plan
Legislation, 1973: Hearings on H.R. 2 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Comm. on Educ.
and Labor, 93d Cong. 1 (1973) (statement of Rep. Dent, Chairman of the Subcommit-
tee on Labor)).
7 See supra note 2.
8 See 120 CONG. REc. 29, 198 (statement of Rep. Ullman) (finding that "these
new requirements have been carefully designed to provide adequate protection for
employees, and, at the same time, provide a favorable setting for the growth and de-
velopment of private pension plans"); id. at 949 (statement of Sen. Bentsen) (noting
that "it is important to recognize that if minimum standards are set too high, we
would discourage the creation of new plans"); see also Brauch, supra note 2, at 1239.
9 Concern about ignoring this goal was one of the motivations promptingJudge
Fernandez's dissent in Bins. See Bins v. Exxon Co., 189 F.3d 929, 941 (9th Cir. 1999)
(Fernandez, J., dissenting); see also Kearney v. Standard Ins. Co., 175 F.3d 1084,
1102-03 (9th Cir. 1999) (Fernandez, J., dissenting).
10 No. 98-55662, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 19080 (9th Cir. Aug. 10, 2000) (en bane).
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ERISA fiduciaries have the affirmative duty to disclose proposed bene-
fit changes, regardless of whether the particular employee had in-
quired about the subject.'1 This panel decision conflicted with
decisions of two other circuits holding that the employer has no duty
to voluntarily disclose proposed benefit changes. 12 This Comment ar-
gues that the Bins panel decision inappropriately extended ERISA fi-
duciary disclosure duties, creating practical problems for employers
and violating the secondary ERISA goal of encouraging the develop-
ment of private pension plans. The reversal en banc by the Ninth Cir-
cuit recognized the practical and theoretical problems of the Bins
decision and correctly limited disclosure duties of proposed benefit
changes.
Part I of this Comment will provide a background of the structure
of ERISA and detail its provisions about fiduciary duties, interpreted
through the common law of trusts. Part II examines the explicit statu-
tory standards of disclosure provided by ERISA, as well as the disclo-
sure standards which are imposed upon fiduciaries through the
fiduciary provisions of ERISA. Part III provides the general guidelines
given by the Supreme Court in Varity Corp. v. Howe 3 in interpreting
these fiduciary provisions of ERISA. Then, the Comment examines
current disputes involving the interpretation and application of fiduci-
ary disclosure duties in Part IV. The Comment looks at the facts, deci-
sions, and reasoning of the Bins court in finding that there is an
affirmative duty to disclose proposed benefit changes even in the ab-
sence of employee inquiry (Part V) and the contrary rulings by the en
bane panel and other circuits (Part VI). Finally, the Comment ana-
lyzes and rejects affirmative disclosure as impractical and creating
heavy burdens upon the employer, having no precedential support,
and being contrary to the legislative intent of Congress in enacting
ERISA.
I. TBE STRucruRE OF ERISA AN IMPOSrriON OF Fmucuwy DuT=s
ERISA, as suggested earlier, 14 broadly regulates and provides em-
ployee safeguards in the area of private pension and other benefits.15
11 Id. at *28 (en banc).
12 See infra note 261.
13 516 U.S. 489 (1996).
14 See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
15 There are two basic types of plans covered by ERISA. One type is defined by
the statute as an "employee welfare benefit plan" or "welfare plan" which provides
"(A) medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the events of sick-
ness, accident, disability, death or unemployment, or vacation benefits... or (B) any
benefit described in Section 186 (c) of this title (other than pensions on retirement
2001]
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For instance, the aforementioned comprehensive mandatory report-
ing and disclosure rules16 are designed to provide plan participants
with complete information concerning their fights under the plan.' 7
ERISA creates an extensive framework of rules that regulates partici-
pation in pension and other benefit plans, as well as regulations gov-
erning the vesting of such plans.' 8 ERISA also contains various
provisions governing the administration and enforcement of these
provisions, 19 as well as specific provisions for plan termination insur-
ance 20 and various regulations for multi-employer plans.2 ' A fre-
quently litigated aspect of ERISA is the statutory fiduciary provisions,
which govern the conduct of plan administrators toward benefi-
ciaries. 22 These provisions are the analytical starting point for exam-
ining whether ERISA's fiduciary provisions mandate affirmative
disclosure duties to plan beneficiaries.
A. Fiduciary Duties Imposed Under ERISA
ERISA designates "fiduciary status" upon a person with respect to
welfare or benefit plans
to the extent (i) he exercises any discretionary authority or discre-
tionary control respecting management of such plan or exercises
any authority or control respecting management or disposition of
its assets, (ii) he renders investment advice for a fee or other com-
pensation, direct or indirect, with respect to any moneys or other
property of such plan, or has any authority or responsibility to do
so, or (iii) he has any discretionary authority or discretionary re-
sponsibility in the administration of such a plan.23
or death, and insurance to provide such pensions)." 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1994). The
second type of plan is defined as an "employee pension benefit plan" or "pension
plan" which "(i) provides retirement income to employees, or (ii) results in a deferral
of income by employees for periods extending to the termination of covered employ-
ment or beyond .... " Id. § 1002(2) (A).
16 See supra note 5.
17 See Shelley L. Ward, Note, Enlarging an Employer's Fiducia. Hat: Varity Corp. v.
Howe Increases Employers'Exposure to Liability When They Act Under ERISA, 34 Hous. L.
REv. 1195, 1199 (1997).
18 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1061 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). For an extensive discus-
sion of the problematic nature of standards and regulations regarding vesting, see
Peter Van Zante, Mandated Vesting: Suppression of Voluntay Retirement Benefits, 75 NOTR
DAME L. REv. 125, 177-200 (1999).
19 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1145 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
20 See id. §§ 1301-1371.
21 See id. §§ 1381-1461.
22 See id. §§ 1101-1114. As will be discussed infra in Part IA, the reason for the
amount of litigation is the broad and ambiguous standards given by the provision.
23 Id. § 1002(21)(A).
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This broad definition emphasizes that fiduciary status is a functional
rather than a designated position. Companies or individuals who fall
within this broad definition do not evade ERISA-imposed require-
ments simply because others are officially designated as "trustee" or
"fiduciary."24
Similarly, ERISA imposes affirmative fiduciary duties in the rele-
vant section in broad and generalized language.2 For instance,
ERISA requires a fiduciary to "discharge his duties solely in the inter-
ests of the participants and beneficiaries"2 6 and "for the exclusive pur-
pose of . . . providing benefits to participants and their
beneficiaries." 27 ERISA limits the self-interested manipulation of plan
assets, both by requiring the fiduciary to discharge his duties solely for
the interest of the beneficiaries and by providing that "the assets of a
plan shall not be held for the benefit of any employer .... "2 8 The
fiduciary duty of absolute loyalty towards beneficiaries is buttressed by
specific prohibitions on self-interested transactions, -9 as well as those
that involve conflicts of interest.30 All of these provisions are enforced
by statutory language providing that fiduciaries are personally liable to
the plan for breaches of duty.31
24 See Brauch, supra note 2, at 1239.
25 See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1114 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
26 Id. § 1104(a) (1). The strict interpretation of this language often leads to re-
sults that seem to forego the alternative intent of ERISA to avoid undue hardships on
the private pension plan system. See Steven Davi, Note, To Tell the Trulh: An Analysis of
Fduciary Disclosure Duties and Employee Standing to Assert Claims Under ERISA, 10 ST.
JoHN'sJ. Lc AL CoBEr.rr. 625, 626 (1995).
27 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1) (A) (i) (1994).
28 I, § 1103(c)(1).
29 See id. § 1106(a).
30 See id. § 1106(b). For an analysis of the various statutory and administrative
exceptions to these prohibited transaction rules, see generally Arthur H. Kroll & Yale
D. Tauber, Fiduciary Responsibility and Prohibited Transactions Under ERISA, 14 RaL.
PROP. PROB. & Tn. J. 657 (1979).
31 See 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (1994), which provides:
[A]ny person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any of
the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by this
subchapter shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any losses
from the plan resulting from each such breach, and to restore to such plan
any profits of such fiduciary which have been made through use of assets of
the plan by the fiduciary, and shall be subject to such other equitable or
remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate, including removal of
such fiduciary.
While this section authorizes relief on behalf of the plan and other equitable reme-
dies, the question of whether individuals can seek relief on behalf of themselves for
breaches of fiduciary duty has generated significant controversy. &e generally Varity
Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489 (1996) (allowing individual beneficiaries to seek equita-
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The generalized language depicting fiduciary duties under
ERISA is evidenced as well by the statutory guidance for how a fiduci-
ary must perform his duties. A fiduciary must discharge his duties
"with the care, skill, prudence and diligence under the circumstances
then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and famil-
iar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise and
With like aims .... -32 This standard uses language reminiscent of
negligence standards in tort law and, standing alone as a statutory
guideline, would appear to be too vague to serve as the federal guide-
line for the administration of all ERISA-covered pension and welfare
benefit plans. The failure of ERISA to elucidate specific guidelines of
fiduciary duties, however, reflects the general reliance on common
law trust relationships as an interpretive guide. The Congressional in-
tent that traditional trust law would provide guidelines for limiting
and regulating fiduciary conduct is clearly reflected in legislative
proceedingsa 3
B. Common Law Trust Principles as Guidelines for Fiduciaries
While providing broad language that gives general principles
rather than specific fiduciary duties, "ERISA's fiduciary provisions and
protections must be read to best effectuate the statute's fundamental
purpose, which is the 'enforcement of strict fiduciary standards of
care in the administration of all aspects of pension plans.' 8" 4 How
ble relief where the employer/plan administrator violates fiduciary duties by deliber-
ating misleading beneficiaries); Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134
(1985) (discussing private rights of action implied under ERISA). This question as-
sumes more importance because of the general consensus that Congress intended the
set of federal remedies (which are the six types of available civil actions identified at
29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1994)) to be exclusive and did not adopt every state remedy that
existed prior to ERISA. See also Brauch, supra note 2, at 1241 (discussing conflicts
over available remedies under ERISA).
32 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1) (B) (1994).
33 See H.R. REP. No. 93-1280, at 298 (1974) (stating that fiduciary responsibility
should be informed by the law of trusts), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.CA.N. 5038, 5076; see
also 120 CONG. REc. 29, 932 (1974) (statement of Sen. Williams, Chairman of the
Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare) (noting that trust law informs fiduciary
responsibility).
34 Bryan J. Clobes, In the Wake of Varity Corp. v. Howe: An Affirmative Fiduciary
Duty to Disclose Under ERISA, 9 DEPAUL Bus. LJ. 221, 223 (1997) (quoting Mass. Mut.
Life, 473 U.S. at 158 (Brennan,J., concurring); Bixler v. Cent. Pa. Teamsters Health
& Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292, 1299 (3d Cir. 1993)); see also 29 U.S.C. § 1001(b)
(1994 & Supp. IV 1998) (giving the legislative purposes of ERISA). Enforcing such
strict fiduciary standards becomes more important in light of the fact that ERISA reg-
ulation of private pension plans preempts state regulation of such plans and thus
leaves enforcement of such standards solely within the statute. See Mathew S. Roten-
[VOL- 76:2'
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does one enforce "strict fiduciary standards of care" with the broad
principles given for fiduciary conduct in the statutory language of
ERISA?
The Congressional answver to this problem was that the common
law of trusts would provide the guidance for enforcing and regulating
specific fiduciary standards under ERISA. 5 In explicitly endorsing
the analogy between the fiduciary/beneficiary relationship under
ERISA and the trustee/beneficiary relationship in the common law of
trusts, Congress created an interpretive scheme which imposes from
trust law the high standards of loyalty and care in the administration
of a trust. 
6
ERISA itself codifies three common law trust principles: the du-
ties to act (1) as a "prudent person" in administering benefit plans,
(2) solely for the interests of the plan's participants and beneficiaries,
and (3) for the exclusive purpose of-providing plan benefits to plan
participants and beneficiaries.37 Rather than list specific fiduciary re-
sponsibilities, ERISA gives these three general principles and evokes
the common law of trusts in applying these broad duties to the various
situations and conflicts that occur in the administration of pension
and benefit plans.38
Most courts have endorsed the relationships from the common
law of trusts providing the guidance and standards by which to en-
force the fiduciary provisions of ERISA.3 9 As the Supreme Court re-
marked, "Rather than explicitly enumerating all of the powers and
duties of trustees and other fiduciaries, Congress invoked the com-
mon law of trusts to define the general scope of their authority and
berg, Note, Fischer v. Philadelphia Electric Co.: The Third Circuit '&Sriousl Considers'
the Fduciary Duty to Disclose Potential Changes to an Employee Benefit Plan Under ERI4, 42
ViI. L REV. 1915, 1918 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994)).
35 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
36 See REsrATENmNT (S-coND) OF TRusTs § 173 cMt. d (1959); me also Bintz, supra
note 4, at 989 ("The legislative history of ERLSA... reflects that ERISA's fiduciary
duty rules are based upon common law trust principles.").
37 See supra notes 25-32 and accompanying text.
38 See Daniel M. Nimtz, Tenth Circuit Suney: ERISA Plan Changes 75 U. D&nv. L
REv. 891, 893 (1998).
39 See Ward, supra note 17, at 1198. But see Porto v. Armco Inc., 825 F.2d 1274,
1276 (8th Cir. 1987) (noting that administrators do not need to provide disclosure
earlier than ERISA requires by its statutory disclosure standards in order to meet their
fiduciary obligations); Kytle v. Stewart Co., 788 F. Supp. 321, 323 (S.D. Tex. 1992)
(deciding that a fiduciary fulfilled his duties simply by complying ith the minimal
reporting requirements of ERISA).
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responsibility."40 Courts are expected to utilize the common law of
trusts to analyze and provide interpretive guidance for the broad fidu-
ciary standards expressed by ERISA. By using these common law prin-
ciples to interpret ERISA's fiduciary standards, courts will develop a
"federal common law of rights and obligations under ERISA-regulated
plans."41 This dependence on the common law of trusts as an inter-
pretive aid led the Supreme Court to refer to trust law as the "starting
point" in interpreting ERISA's fiduciary duties.42
However, this general reliance on the common law of trusts to
interpret the broad fiduciary provisions of ERISA has some drawbacks.
The first and foremost problem, as noted earlier,43 is that both courts
and legal commentators emphasize trust law relationships to the ex-
clusion of ERISA's purpose of encouraging the formation of em-
40 Cent. States, S.E. & S.W. Areas rension Fund v. Cent. Transp., Inc., 472 U.S.
559, 570 (1985).
41 Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 56 (1987).
42 Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 497 (1996). While there is a general con-
sensus that the common law of trusts informs the interpretation of fiduciary duties in
ERISA, this particular statement by the Court drew sharp criticism from the dissent in
Varity. The dissent noted, "This is a novel approach to statutory construction, one
that stands our traditional approach on its head." Id. at 528 (Thomas,J., dissenting).
The dissent felt that "we must not forget that ERISA is a statute, and in 'every case
involving a statute, the starting point is the language itself.'" Id. (quoting Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976)). However, even the dissent also explic-
ity endorsed the notion that the common law of trusts plays a role in the interpreta-
tion of fiduciary duties under ERISA. See id.
However, the reference by the majority to the common law of trusts as the "start-
ing point" of ERISA interpretation is often taken out of context. The majority's actual
reference was that
the law of trusts will often inform, but will not necessarily determine the
outcome of, an effort to interpret ERISA's fiduciary duties .... [T] rust law
will offer only a starting point after which courts might go on to ask
whether... the language of the statute, its structure, or its purposes require
departing from common-law trust requirements.
Id. at 497.
The emphasis on trust law as the basis of interpretation of ERISA's fiduciary stan-
dards is emphasized by both courts and legal commentators, often to the extent of
perhaps giving lesser attention to the secondary purpose of ERISA. See supra note 26.
As even Varity recognized, "Congress expected that the courts will interpret this pru-
dent man rule [and the other fiduciary standards] bearing in mind the special nature
and purpose of employee benefit plans." Varity, 516 U.S. at 497 (citing H.R. Rrt,. No,
93-1280, at 295, 302 (1974)). The lack of emphasis both on the special and distinctive
nature of employee benefit plans as opposed to general trust law relationships and on
the importance of making compliance with ERISA fiduciary standards ameliorative to
the formation and strengthening of the private pension plan system will be discussed
later in this Comment. See infra Part VII.
43 See supra notes 26, 42.
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ployee benefit plans, and often ignore the special circumstances and
peculiar problems that arise from private pension and welfare benefit
plans provided by employers. Another problem involves the applica-
tion by courts of the common law of trusts to interpret the fiduciary
provisions of ERISA. This process necessarily leads to inconsistent ju-
dicial interpretations, 44 which provoke further litigation over fiduciary
standards, create inefficiency, and lessen the incentives to encourage
or expand employee benefit plans.
U-. STATUTORY AND FmucrARY STANDARDS OF DsCLosuRE
UNDER ERISA
What effect do ambiguous fiduciary standards have upon disputes
over disclosure duties of employer-fiduciaries? The disputes involve
fiduciary standards because courts have found that there are various
disclosure duties implied through the fiduciary duties section of
ERISA. While ERISA provides specific information-disclosure-require-
ments within the statute itself, fiduciary disclosure standards are also
imposed simply because the plan administrator is also a fiduciary.
A. Statutory Standards of Disclosure Under ERISA
What levels of disclosure, then, are fiduciaries required to main-
tain with respect to a beneficiary of an ERISA-regulated plan? The
ERISA statute gives minimum disclosure and reporting require-
ments,45 which are "designed to provide plan participants with com-
plete information concerning their rights under the plan. " 46 Under
ERISA, every plan must designate a fiduciary to manage the plan.47 As
noted earlier, the fiduciary definition is functional and includes trust-
ees, plan administrators with discretionary authority over the plan, in-
vestment committees and advisors, and any individuals who select the
44 See Nimtz, supra note 38, at 892. There has certainly been no shortage of vary-
ing interpretations of ERISA fiduciary requirements. For some of the issues that are
under dispute, see id. at 892 n.5.
45 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). For a summary descrip-
tion of the basic reporting obligations of the ERISA fiduciary, see Rotenberg, supra
note 34, at 1920-21 nn.24-25.
46 Ward, supra note 17, at 1200.
47 29 U.S.C. § 1022 (1994 & Supp. V 1998). For the broad definition of "fiduci-
ary" under ERISA, see supra text accompanying note 23. One must also remember
that this broad "functional" definition of fiduciary means that one cannot escape such
duties by designating another party as the fiduciary of a particular plan, if that per-
son's activities towards the plan fall within the fiduciary definition. Ste supra note 24
and accompanying text.
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people in these positions.48 Even more important, employers are also
considered fiduciaries when they act as plan administrators with dis-
cretionary control over the plan49 -a common situation with such
benefits as early retirement incentives.5 0
There are minimal disclosure requirements given by the statutory
language of ERISA for such fiduciaries. In order to ensure effective
regulation of the administration of private pension plans, ERISA re-
quires that certain information regarding the plan terms and finances
be filed with the Department of Labor, the Pension Benefit Guaranty
Corporation, and the Internal Revenue Service.51 ERISA mandates
not only disclosure and reporting of information to government regu-
latory agencies, however, but also the provision of certain information
to plan participants themselves.
Besides a summary plan description, a plan administrator must
also provide a "summary annual report," within seven months of the
close of the plan year, that summarizes the financial status of the
plan.5 2 The report must include the amount of administrative ex-
penses incurred, the benefits paid to participants and beneficiaries,
the value of plan assets and income or loss for the year, and the net
unrealized appreciation in plan assets during the year.55 For defined
pension benefit plans, this summary report must also provide a state-
ment regarding compliance with ERISA minimum funding
standards.5 4
ERISA also gives plan participants other informational rights.
Plan participants and beneficiaries must be provided, upon request,
with a statement of their total accrued benefits, non-forfeitable bene-
fits, and the earliest date on which benefits will become non-forfeita-
48 See Ward, supra note 17, at 1200 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-21 (1996)).
49 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(B) (1994).
50 See infra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
51 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1025 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). For instance, the summary
plan description must be filed with the Department of Labor within 120 days of the
date on which the plan becomes subject to ERISA's reporting and disclosure require-
ments. See id. § 1024(a) (1) (B); 29 C.F.R. § 2520.102-3 (1999).
52 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(3) (1994). A participant is entitled to request a copy of
the full annual report, which contains detailed information regarding the financial
condition of the plan. This report is filed each year with the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice, the Department of Labor, and the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. See
id. § 1024(b) (4).
53 Bintz, supra note 4, at 982 n.10 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 2520.104(b)-10(d) (1996)).
54 Id. at 982-83 (citing 29 C.F.R. §2520.104(b)-10(d) (1996)). ERISA also re-
quires notification to plan participants of failures to satisfy ERISA's minimum funding
standards. See 29 U.S.C. § 1021(d) (1994).
[VOL 76:2
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ble.55 Plan participants must be notified by the plan administrator at
least fifteen days prior to any amendment of a defined benefit plan or
individual account plan that significantly reduces the rate of future
benefit accruals.5 6
All of these statutory reporting and disclosure requirements are
aimed to provide information to participants (as well as government
regulators) about the administration of employee benefit plans.
While these statutory requirements impose certain duties upon em-
ployers and other plan fiduciaries, do they constitute the sum total of
disclosure duties owed by ERISA fiduciaries? While some courts have
attempted to limit disclosure duties to those defined by statute,5 7 most
courts instead interpret the general fiduciary duty provisions of
ERISA58 to require more than simply the statutory reporting and dis-
closure provisions.
B. Common Law Fiduciary Standards of Disclosure Under ERISA
As noted earlier,59 courts refer to the common law of trusts in
order to interpret the general fiduciary standards provided by ERISA.
While ERISA provides fairly detailed requirements regarding report-
ing and disclosure, 60 courts examine the common law of trusts to re-
55 29 U.S.C. § 1025(a) (1994). A plan administrator is also required to provide to
a participant who separated from service during the plan year and has a deferred
vested benefit a statement reflecting the nature, amount, and form of the partici-
pant's benefit and other information. Statements must be provided to all participants
who terminate employment before becoming vested. See id. § 1059.
56 Id. § 1054(h). ERISA also provides for certain notices to be given to partici-
pants in connection with the termination of a plan governed by Title IV of ERISA. Id.
§ 1341. There are various notice requirements required by the Internal Revenue
Code relating to employee benefit plans. See .L.C. §§ 402(f) (requiring notice ex-
plaining special tax treatment of distributions qualifying for rollover and lump sum
treatment); 412(f) (4) (requiring notice of filing of a funding waiver request); 417
(requiring notices relating to survivor annuity rates) (1994 & Supp. 1V 1998).
57 E.g., Kytle v. Stewart Co., 788 F. Supp. 321,323 (S.D. Tex. 1992) (deciding that
a fiduciary fulfilled his duties simply by complying with the minimal reporting re-
quirements of ERISA); see also Porto v. Armco Inc., 825 F.2d 1274, 1276 (8th Cir.
1987) (holding that administrators do not need to provide disclosure earlier than
required by ERISA's statutory disclosure standards to meet their fiduciary duty).
58 Courts interpret these fiduciary provisions by applying the common law of
trusts. See supra notes 35-42 and accompanying text.
59 See id.
60 See supra Part HA (discussing the reporting and disclosure provisions of 29
U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031 (1994)).
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solve situations where a fiduciary's disclosure duties under ERISA
might extend beyond those required by statute.61
Because the common law of trusts is an interpretive guide, "the
scope of a fiduciary's duty to disclose at common law is highly relevant
to the existence and scope of such a duty under ERISA. '' 62 At com-
mon law, the trustee has a duty of disclosure that requires him to
"communicate to the beneficiary material facts affecting the interest
of the beneficiary which he knows the beneficiary does not know and
which the beneficiary needs to know for his protection in dealing with
a third person with respect to his interest."63 The common law rules
were designed to protect the interests of the beneficiaries-who are
"always entitled to such information as is reasonably necessary to en-
able them to enforce their rights under the trust or to prevent or re-
dress a breach of trust."6 4 Applying these general principles from
trust law creates a broader disclosure obligation for ERISA fiduciaries,
but courts have recognized that these obligations reflect the special
character and intent of ERISA.65
Prior to the enactment of ERISA, many state courts applied an
obligation of general disclosure for fiduciaries of employee benefits. 66
For instance, the New Jersey Superior Court in Branch v. White67
found the trustees of a pension plan had a fiduciary duty to disclose
the plan's eligibility requirements to all potential participants.68 This
particular plan had been established through a collective bargaining
agreement between a union and an association of contractors and re-
61 See Davi, supra note 26, at 643 n.101, discussing Palinov v. Casey, 664 F.2d 854
(1st Cir. 1981), as one of the first cases that found obligations for a fiduciary to dis-
close plan amendments prior to the date required by express ERISA reporting and
disclosure provisions. The court reasoned the trustee was governed by a "fairness"
criterion in communicating plan changes, which was violated when participants, with
minimal effort after receiving such information, could have avoided the loss of their
pension plans. Id. For other early cases imposing fiduciary disclosure duties beyond
express requirements, see Agro v.Joint Plumbing Industrial Building, 623 F.2d 207, 211
(2d Cir. 1980), and Valle v. Joint Plumbing Industrial Building 623 F.2d 196, 203 (2d
Cir. 1980).
62 Bintz, supra note 4, at 985.
63 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 173 cmt. d (1959).
64 Id.
65 See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 497 (1996) ("Trust law will offer a
starting point, after which courts must go on to ask whether... the language of the
statute, its structure, or its purposes require departing from common law trust
requirements.").
66 See Rotenberg, supra note 34, at 1924. For a discussion of federal regulation of
private pension plans, see supra note 3 and accompanying text.
67 239 A.2d 665 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1968).
68 Id. at 671.
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quired participating employees to contribute two dollars each month
to fund the plan.6 9 The plaintiffs were non-union members, who
claimed that they were not informed about the plan or its eligibility
requirements, but that members of the union had been provided such
information.70 The disclosure obligation found by the court mirrored
the broader obligation of trustees under the Restatement to provide all
information necessary for beneficiaries to enforce their rights, as well
as the common law duty of loyalty imposed on trustees.71 Several
other state courts also imposed broad fiduciary duties upon trustees
before the advent of ERISA,72 reflecting the Restatement language
about providing beneficiaries all material information that is neces-
sary to enforce their rights.73
Since the common law before ERISA recognized a fiduciary duty
of disclosure to beneficiaries in certain circumstances, "there is no
'well-grounded basis on which wholly to exclude a duty to disclose
from ERISA's fiduciary requirements." 7 4 These disclosure duties
stem from the interpretation of the fiduciary provisions of ERISA,7w in
light of the common law, as opposed to the specific disclosure and
reporting standards of ERISA_76
69 Id. at 668.
70 Id,
71 These broad disclosure obligations based on common law trust obligations
formed the basis of other pre-ERISA holdings in NewJersey about disclosure obliga-
tions. See Shallcross Express, Inc. v. Local 478 Trucking & Allied Indus. Pension
Fund, 290 A2d 744, 751-52 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1972) (requiring trustees to
disclose all facts within their knowledge that are material to the protection of benefi-
ciaries' interests).
72 E.g., Lix v. Edwards, 147 Cal. Rptr. 294, 299-300 (Cal. CL App. 1978); Erion v.
Tinken Co., 368 N.E.2d 312, 313-14 (Ohio CL App. 1976). In Lix, the California
Court of Appeals held trustees of a pension fund had a fiduciary duty to disclose the
manner in which they were interpreting a short-term contribution provision, when
such interpretation resulted in adverse consequences to the beneficiaries. Lix, 147
Cal. Rptr. at 299-300. The court estopped the trustees from terminating the plain-
tiffs' benefits because the trustees failed to provide such notice. Id. In Eiion, the
surviving spouse of a retiree claimed her husband's former employer negligently
failed to inform him that delaying his retirement would entitle him to a survivor death
benefit. Ermo, 368 N.E.2d at 313-14. The Ohio Court of Appeals concluded that a
fiduciary relationship existed between the employer and employees regarding discus-
sions with prospective retirees. Id Although the employer was not obligated to ex-
plain "every legal ramification" of the pension plan, the obvious and more pertinent
points should have been brought to the attention of the employee without a specific
question. Id. at 317.
73 See RESTATmENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS § 173 cmt. d (1959).
74 Rotenberg, supra note 34, at 1926 (quoting Bintz, supra note 4, at 989).
75 See supra notes 23-33 and accompanying texL
76 See supra Part HA
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Certainly, the acceptance of disclosure standards for fiduciaries
beyond the minimum specific requirements of ERISA has not been
universal. 7" As some commentators have noted, however, decisions
attempting to limit disclosure duties to the statutory disclosure stan-
dards have failed to reconcile the minimum reporting and disclosure
duties of ERISA with the statute's broad language about the scope of
fiduciary duty.78 Supporters of broad disclosure duties based on the
fiduciary language in ERISA do not think the extent of disclosure re-
quirements is unlimited. As always, the specific purpose and nature of
ERISA should always be kept in mind-protecting employees' rights
to pension and welfare benefits,79 as well as encouraging the develop
ment of the private pension and welfare benefit system without bur-
dening it.80
In their application to ERISA fiduciary standards, the common
law disclosure duties should extend beyond minimum statutory re-
quirements only in particular situations where disclosure duties clearly
advance the aforementioned goals of ERISA.81 Furthermore, there is
a presumption against imposing a fiduciary duty to disclose when the
duty would contradict or supplant an express reporting and disclosure
requirement.82 The Supreme Court in Varity stated that fiduciary du-
77 See Bintz, supra note 4, at 990 (describing a case that limited disclosure to the
statutory requirements); see also supra note 37.
78 See Davi, supra note 26, at 642-43 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21) (1994)). Davi
also cites Bintz's argument that the simple expression of minimum reporting and
disclosure standards should not bar disclosure obligations from the fiduciary provi-
sions, because "the maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius ... does not apply
when there is evidence of contrary legislative policy or intent." Bintz, supra note 4, at
988, cited in Davi, supra note 26, at 644.
79 See 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998); H.R. RP. No. 93-533, at 1-5
(1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4639-43; H.R. REP. No. 93-807, at 8-9
(1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.CA.N. 4670, 4676-77; S. REP. No. 93-127, at 15-16
(1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.CAN. 4838, 4851; S. REP. No. 93-383, at 11-13 (1974),
reprinted in 1974 U.S.S.CA.N. 4890, 4898-99.
80 See supra note 8.
81 See Bintz, supra note 4, at 989-90.
82 Id. at 990. This method of applying the fiduciary duty to disclose seems to
have been endorsed by the Supreme Court in Varity, where the Court noted:
[C] ourts must go on to ask whether... the language of the statute, its struc-
ture, or its purposes require departing from common law trust require-
ments .... [C]ourts may have to take account of competing congressional
purposes, such as Congress' desire to offer employees enhanced protection
for their benefits ... [aind] its desire not to create a system that is so com-
plex that administrative costs, or litigation expenses, unduly discourage em-
ployers from offering welfare benefit plans in the first place.
Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 497 (1996).
COMMENT: BINS V. EXXON CO.
ties under ERISA, at the minimum, require disclosures to beneficiaries
to be accurate, not misleading, and must be consistent with the duty
of loyalty owed by all fiduciaries.83
While some case law dealing with fiduciary disclosure duties
emerged before the statute was enacted,84 numerous conflicts involv-
ing fiduciary duties to disclose information have arisen in the era of
corporate downsizing. Companies seeking to downsize often offer va-
rious financially advantageous methods of lowering the size of their
workforce. 85 One method is the voluntary severance package, which
induces employees to sever before retirement to reduce restructuring
costs.8 6 The severance package typically adds additional years to an
employee's age and years of service with the company, allowing the
employee to retire early with more benefits, while eliminating the
overall cost of employment to the employer.87 The introduction of
these plans has raised several questions about fiduciary duties of dis-
closure-including when or whether employees must be informed
about proposed severance packages, or whether an employer could
use misleading phrases or remain silent about such packages upon
inquiry from the employee. Applying fiduciary duties of disclosure in
these situations is more problematic, because such duties may hinder
the ERISA objectives of encouraging the development of the private
pension system without placing an undue burden upon the system.
Bins followed a string of several cases-all involving the central issue
of the fiduciary disclosure duties an employer has towards employees
with regard to these types of severance packages.
H. VARmY' CORP. v. How. FIDucIARY STANDARDs OF DIscLosuRE
While Varity does not address several of the main fiduciary disclo-
sure issues, the Supreme Court provided several general statements
about the broad scope of the fiduciary disclosure duty,8s which are
starting points for the fiduciary disclosure of retirement package offer-
ings. While much of the opinion (as well as the dissent) deals with
issues involving appropriate ERISA remedies for injured benefi-
83 See Varity, 516 U.S. at 506. The impact of Variy on the standards of fiduciary
duties is discussed in Part I of this Comment.
84 See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
85 See Barry, supra note 6, at 751 n.92 ("It has become commonplace for employ-
ers seeking to reduce their work forces to offer substantial early retirement packages




88 See Rotenberg, supra note 34, at 1926-27.
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ciaries,89 Varfity provides clear guidance about the application of com-
mon law standards to the fiduciary duties under ERISA.90
Charles Howe and other plaintiffs in Varity were employees of
Massey-Ferguson, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of the defendant,
Varity Corporation. 91 Varity transferred several of its money-losing di-
visions to a newly created separately incorporated subsidiary, Massey
Combines.92 Varity induced several employees to transfer to this divi-
sion, releasing Massey-Ferguson from its obligation to provide them
benefits and accepting the self-funded benefit plans of Massey Com-
bines.93 In persuading these employees, Varity held a special meeting
where representations were made that the employees' benefits would
remain secure with the transfer to Massey Combines.94 Within two
years, Massey Combines went into receivership and these employees
lost their non-pension benefits. 95 The promises and assurances about
secure benefits were made despite the fact that Massey Combines was
essentially insolvent from inception, with a negative net worth and lia-
bilities exceeding assets by $46 million. 96
While the Supreme Court primarily reviewed Varity to resolve dis-
putes among the courts of appeals about appropriate remedies under
ERISA,97 the Court went beyond this question to address (1) whether
the conduct of Varity violated its fiduciary duties and (2) the distinc-
tion between its discretionary actions as an employer and its fiduciary
duties as a plan administrator.98 After stating that the common law of
trusts is the "starting point" for interpretation of the fiduciary provi-
sions of ERISA,99 the Court recognized that all such interpretations
must be made in light of the specific purposes for which ERISA was
89 Arguments about the remedies provided by ERISA to individual plan partici-
pants who are wronged by the fiduciaries of a plan are beyond the scope of this Corn-
ment. For a discussion of these issues, see generally KarlJ. Stoecker, ERISA Remedies
After Varity Corp v. Howe, 9 DEPAUL Bus. LJ. 237 (1997). See also Ward, supra note
17, at 1220-42 (discussing remedies for wronged individual plan participants).
90 See Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 496-507 (1996).
91 Id. at 492.
92 Id. at 493.
93 Id. at 493-94.
94 Id. at 493-94, 499-501.
95 Id. at 494.
96 See Clobes, supra note 34, at 233.
97 See Varity, 516 U.S. at 495.
98 See id.
99 Id. at 497. The dissent vigorously disagreed with this position, suggesting the
only possible starting point must be the statutory language itself. Id. at 528 (Thomas,
J., dissenting).
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enacted. 00 The Court then addressed three separate issues, which
provide guidelines for the extent of fiduciary disclosure duties and
highlight issues that have yet to be resolved.
A. Extent of Fiduciary Disclosure Duties Under Varity
Justice Steven Breyer, writing for the majority, flatly rejected
Varity's argument that its fiduciary disclosure responsibilities were ful-
filled by compliance with ERISA statutory requirements and the terms
of the plan instruments.' 0 ' As the Court noted, "If the fiduciary duty
applied to nothing more than activities already controlled by other
specific legal duties, it would serve no purpose."10 2 The most notewor-
thy aspect of this rejection is that the Court assumed that disclosure
wvas part of the fiduciary duty of plan administrators.10 3 Therefore,
one can assume there are some fiduciary disclosure duties beyond the
statutory disclosure duties and those mandated by the terms of the
plan itself.
The second relevant issue was the Court's decision that Varity's
conduct itself violated fiduciary duties. 10 4 Justice Breyer characterized
Varity's behavior as "deceiving a plan's beneficiaries in order to save
the employer money at the beneficiaries' expense." 0 : Breyer felt
such actions were clearly inconsistent with ERISA's mandate to act
"solely in the interests of participants and beneficiaries,"10 6 as well as
with the common law duty of loyalty for a trustee, which is included in
ERISA's fiduciary duties. 0 7 Thus, the Court left a clear guideline that
100 I. at 497. For a discussion of the various Congressional purposes of ERISA,
see supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
101 See Vaify, 516 U.S. at 504. This rejection would seem to place in doubt lower
court decisions that have found no violation of fiduciary duties when such statutory
and plan requirements were met. See supra note 39.
102 Varity, 516 U.S. at 504.
103 This assumption might have been explicit rather than implicit, because the
Court indicated that information disclosure was part of the fiduciary duty, since trust
law traditionally conveyed the powers necessary for carrying out the purposes of tie
trust. This discussion, however, was limited to tie Court's analysis of whether Virity
was acting as an employer or a fiduciary in its informational sessions. &e id. at 502
(citing 3 A. Scorr & W. FRATCHER, LW OF TRUSTS § 186 (4th ed. 1988)).
104 See Variy, 516 U.S. at 506.
105 Id. The dissent characterized Varity's conduct much more benignly, sug-
gesting that it involved a combination of optimistic statements and a dear reservation
of the right to terminate, amend, or modify the plan on relevant distributed docu-
ments at the meeting. See id. at 538 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
106 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a) (1) (A) (i) (1994).
107 See Varity, 516 U.S. at 506 (citing Cent. States, S.E. & SA Pension Fund v.
Cent. Transp., Inc., 472 U.S. 559, 570-71 (1985)).
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affirmative misrepresentations in disclosures by employers violate fi-
duciary duties imposed by ERISA.
Finally, the Court noted that it "need not reach the question
whether ERISA fiduciaries have any fiduciary duty to disclose truthful
information on their own initiative, or in response to employee in-
quiries."' 08 Both before and since the decision in Varity, these situa-
tions remain a source of constant litigation, with disagreements
among the courts of appeals about the scope of fiduciary duties. 10 9
In its discussion about the scope of fiduciary duties then, Varity
provided two basic guidelines: (1) there are fiduciary disclosure duties
beyond the minimum reporting and disclosure duties of ERISA statu-
tory provisions and, (2) at a minimum, ERISA fiduciaries cannot af-
firmatively mislead beneficiaries about existing or proposed benefit
plans.110 However, the Supreme Court refused to address an issue
which has generated a tremendous amount of litigation both before
and since Varity-the fiduciary duty to disclose information either on
the employer's own initiative, or in response to employee inquiry. 111
These situations are further complicated because, as mentioned ear-
lier,1 2 they often involve disclosure of proposed changes in benefit
108 Id.
109 See generally Bins v. Exxon Co., 189 F.3d 929 (9th Cir. 1999) (rejecting aflirma-
tive disclosure duties), rev'd en banc, No. 98-55662, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 19080 (9th
Cir. Aug. 10, 2000); Vartanian v. Monsanto Co., 131 F.3d 264 (1st Cir. 1997) (adopt-
ing the serious consideration test); Becker v. Eastman Kodak Co., 120 F.3d 5 (2d Cir.
1997) (noting materiality as the test for misrepresentations); Hockett v. Sun Co., 109
F.3d 1515 (10th Cir. 1997) (adopting the serious consideration test); Fischer v. Phila.
Elec. Co. (Fischer II), 96 F.3d 1533 (3d Cir. 1996) (giving three elements to the seri-
ous consideration test); Chiles v. Ceridian Co., 95 F.3d 1505 (10th Cir. 1996) (no
affirmative misrepresentations by employer-fiduciary); Glaziers & Glassworkers Union
Local #252 v. New Bridge Sec., 93 F.3d 1171 (3d Cir. 1996) (no affirmative misrepre-
sentations); Swinney v. Gen. Motors, 46 F.3d 512 (6th Cir. 1995) (same); Mullins v.
Pfizer, 23 F.3d 663 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding a duty to be truthful); Bixler v. Cent. Ila.
Teamsters Health &Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292 (3d Cir. 1993) (individualized disclo-
sure duty); Anweiler v. Am. Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 3 F.3d 986 (7th Cir. 1993) (indi.
vidualized disclosure duty); Drennan v. Gen. Motors, 977 F.2d 246 (6th Cir. 1992) (no
affirmative misrepresentations); Barnes v. Lacy, 927 F.2d 539 (11th Cir. 1991) (same);
Stanton v. Gulf Oil Corp., 792 F.2d 432 (4th Cir. 1986) (no affirmative disclosure
duties). For a discussion of many of these seminal cases regarding disclosure duties of
employers for proposed benefit changes, see infra Parts IV-VI.
110 As the Court noted, "[W]e can find no adequate basis here ... for any special
interpretation that might insulate Varity, acting as a fiduciary, from the legal conse-
quences of the kind of conduct (intentional misrepresentation) that often creates
liability even among strangers." Varity, 516 U.S. at 506.
111 See id.
112 See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
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plans or enhanced retirement packages, s which create strong eco-
nomic incentives for non-disclosure by employers.
B. Distinguishing Discretionary Actions v. Fiduciary Duties Under Varity
Varity Corp. argued that its communications to its employees re-
garding benefits" 4 were not fiduciary acts of administering or manag-
ing the plan-rather, they were the discretionary acts of an
employer." 5 Courts have consistently held that fiduciary obligations
imposed upon employers are separate from the employer's discretion-
ary power-for instance, to amend or terminate a plan." 6 The gen-
eral principle is that "employers remain unilaterally free to adopt,
amend or terminate welfare benefit plans."" 7 For instance, the Ninth
Circuit held there was no breach of fiduciary duty when an employer
threatened to terminate employees unless they accepted a reduction
in unaccrued benefits as consistent with this discretionary power." 8
Similarly, another court found no fiduciary breach by a president pay-
ing the business expenses of the company at a time of potential col-
lapse, since these were discretionary actions in the company's
interest." 9 The courts have shown deference to the theory that em-
ployers often wear "two hatsr-that of administrator of employee ben-
efit plans with fiduciary duties, as well as that of employer, which
carries large powers to take discretionary actions.' 20 "[A] simplistic
formulation of the distinction is that a person is not acting as a fiduci-
113 See generally Wayne v. Pac. Bell Corp., 189 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2000) (early retire-
ment package); Bins, 189 F.3d 929 (same); Fischer, 96 F.3d 1533 (same); Pocchia v.
Nynex Corp., 81 F.3d 275 (2d Cir. 1996) (same).
114 For a brief summary of the facts of Varitv, see supra text accompan)ing notes
91-96.
115 Varity, 516 U.S. at 498.
116 See Davi, supra note 26, at 638-39.
Employers often engage in discretionary policy decisions such as creating,
amending or terminating a pension plan as well as administrative decisions
regarding an existing plan. Courts have been tolerant of employers' dual
roles in designing and administering employee benefit plans, only imposing
ERISA fiduciary obligations on employers acting in their fiduciary capacity as
plan administrators.
Id (citing William L. Scogland, Fiduday Duty: What Does It Mean?, 1989 A.B.A. SEC.
TORT & INs. PRAC. 806.
117 Nimtz, supra note 38, at 903 (citing Curtis-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514
U.S. 73 (1995)).
118 West v. Greyhound Corp., 813 F.2d 951, 955-56 (9th Cir. 1986).
119 United Mine Workers of Am. v. Powatan Fuel, 828 F.2d 710,713-14 (11th Cir.
1987).
120 See Drennan v. Gen. Motors Corp., 977 F.2d 246, 251 (6th Cir. 1992) (recogniz-
ing the "employer's prerogative to initiate discretionary policy decisions such as creat-
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ary when he makes business decisions that affect employee plans, but
is a fiduciary when he acts with respect to a plan in an attempt to
effect business ends.''
While Varity does not provide clear guidelines for distinguishing
between the roles of fiduciary and employer, the Court's decision sug-
gests that it may be difficult for any employer to ignore its fiduciary
disclosure roles when communicating with its employee-beneficiaries.
Varity Corp. argued that its communications to its employees about
benefits inducing them to transfer to Massey Combines were in the
capacity of an employer and not of a plan administrator. 122 After ex-
amining the ERISA definition of fiduciary actions, 123 the Court looked
to the common law of trusts and found that trust law implicitly confers
"such powers as are necessary to or appropriate for carrying out the
purposes" of the trust.124 The Court reasoned that conveyance of in-
formation about the likely future of plan benefits was the exercise of
such a power necessary or appropriate for providing beneficiaries de-
tailed plan information as the administrator of a benefit plan. 125 Mov-
ing beyond this proposition, the Court also noted that the "reasonable
employee" could have interpreted the employer making such communi-
cations to be acting in its capacity as a plan administrator. 126 This
ing, amending, or terminating a particular plan... for the benefit and interests of its
participant-employees").
121 Amato v. W. Union Int'l Inc., 773 F.2d 1402, 1416-17 (2d Cir. 1985); see also
Berlin v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 858 F.2d 1154, 1163 (6th Cir. 1988) (noting that ERISA
does not interfere with an employer acting solely as a businessman in the interest of
the business).
122 Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 498 (1996).
123 See 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (21) (A) (1994), which states that a person is a fiduciary
to the extent (i) he exercises any discretionary authority or discretionary
control respecting management of such plan or exercises any authority or
control respecting management or disposition of its assets, (ii) he renders
investment advice for a fee or other compensation, direct or indirect, with
respect to any moneys or other property of such plan, or has any authority or
responsibility to do so, or (iii) he has any discretionary authority or discre-
tionary responsibility in the administration of such a plan.
124 Vaiity, 516 U.S. at 502 (quoting 3 A. ScoTr & W. FRATcHER, LAW OF ThuSm
§ 186 (4th ed. 1988)).
125 Id. at 502-03. The dissent saw such actions as representations about the cur-
rent and expected financial condition of the corporation and, as such, made in the
"'employer's corporate non-fiduciary capacity as plan sponsor or settlor' .... [T]hey
are necessary incidents of conducting a business." Id. at 530 (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(quoting Borst v. Chevron Corp., 36 F.3d 1308, 1323 n.28 (5th Cir. 1994)). The dis-
sent also placed great weight on the fact that these types of representations were not
included in the Act's disclosure requirements. See id. at 532.
126 Id. at 503.
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ruling creates uncertainty about any clear distinctions between the fi-
duciary and discretionary roles-the determination might be made
on the subjective reasonable employee's perspective on the role of the
employer in certain acts.
The Court flatly rejected Varity's argument that its actions were
discretionary since they were neither required by ERISA's statutory
disclosure regime or the terms of the plan.12 7 Justice Breyer explicitly
stated that Varity was not acting as a fiduciary because it made state-
ments about the financial future of Massey Combines or its business
decision turned out to have an adverse impact upon the plan, but that
"Varity intentionally connected its statements about . . . financial
health... to the future of benefits, so that its intended communica-
tion about benefits was materially misleading."128
Varity elucidates general principles about discerning between the
fiduciary acts of a plan administrator and the discretionary acts of an
employer. Employers must be cautious about any communications
with their employees about plan benefits, because they will likely be
governed by a fiduciary standard. Secondly, it is possible that an em-
ployer may be making a discretionary decision, but still be subject to
fiduciary duties if perceived to be acting in the fiduciary role by their
employees. As one commentator noted, " [E] mployers are likely to be
considered fiduciaries whenever they say something that an employee
could reasonably understand to involve the future security of their
benefit plans."' 2 9
IV. CuRRENT DIsPuTEs OVER THE FmuciAARY DUT= TO DISCLOSE
While the Supreme Court decision in Varity gave general guide-
lines about analyzing the scope of the fiduciary duty,130 the decision
left open many questions about fiduciary duties, which have been the
source of constant litigation, both before and after the Varity decision.
One source of many fiduciary disclosure disputes deals with individual-
ized disclosure about the various options or benefits available under
pension plans. To what extent are employer-fiduciaries required to
inform, disclose, and explain the various options that are material to
127 See id. at 504.
128 Id. at 505.
129 Ward, supra note 17, at 1240. The volume of litigation involving breach of
fiduciary disclosure duties since Varity has proved Ward right about the impact of this
vague standard. See id. at 1241 ("Ultimately, employers will be subject to increased
litigation and elevated litigation costs.").
130 See supra Part lII.A.
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the choices facing the employee-beneficiary?' 3 ' Another source of
disputes revolves around fiduciary disclosure duties about proposed
benefit plans or changes. Here, the dispute centers over when and to
what extent an employer-fiduciary must disclose proposed benefit or
plan changes to employee-beneficiaries. 132
A. Individualized Disclosure About Available Benefits and Options
While the law remains unsettled about the scope of a fiduciary's
duty to disclose beyond the specific reporting and disclosure require-
ments of ERISA, Varity has provided basic guidelines about the analy-
sis of the scope of this duty.'33 One absolute principle is that plan
administrators and fiduciaries cannot make misrepresentations about
the plan or proposed changes to the employee-beneficiary. 34 As one
commentator has noted: "[A]ny communication by a fiduciary must
be truthful and complete .... [P]lan fiduciaries are obligated to pro-
vide complete and accurate information in response to questions by
participants concerning employee benefits and benefit plans."' 3 5
While there is general agreement that the fiduciary duty prohibits
misrepresentations to beneficiaries, some courts have imposed a
"broad fiduciary duty to provide individualized disclosure to partici-
pants and beneficiaries."1 36 The seminal case for this proposition is
Eddy v. Colonial Life Insurance Co.137
131 See, e.g., Bixler v. Cent. Pa. Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292,
1296 (3d Cir. 1993); Anweiler v. Am. Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 3 F.3d 986, 989 (7th Cir.
1993); Eddy v. Colonial Life Ins. Co., 919 F.2d 747, 751 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
132 See Varity, 516 U.S. at 506; see, e.g., Vartanian v. Monsanto Co., 131 F.3d 264,
268 (1st Cir. 1997); Becker v. Eastman Kodak Co., 120 F.3d 5, 12 (2d Cir. 1997);
Ballone v. Eastman Kodak Co., 109 F.3d 117, 120 (2d Cir. 1997); Muse v. IBM Corp.,
103 F.3d 490, 495 (6th Cir. 1996); Fischer v. Phila. Elec. Co. (Fischer II), 96 F.3d 1533,
1540 (3d Cir. 1996); Pocchia v. Nynex Corp., 81 F.3d 275, 280-81 (2d Cir. 1996);
Mullins v. Pfizer, 23 F.3d 663, 669 (2d Cir. 1994); Berlin v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 858
F.2d 1154, 1160 (6th Cir. 1992).
133 See supra Part III.A.
134 See, e.g., Vartanian, 131 F.3d at 268; Wilson v. S.W. Bell Tel. Co., 55 F.3d 399,
405 (8th Cir. 1995); Maez v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel., Inc., 54 F.3d 1488, 1499-501
(10th Cir. 1995); Taylor v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., 49 F.3d 982, 990 (3d Cir. 1995);
Swinney v. Gen. Motors Corp., 46 F.3d 512, 520-21 (6th Cir. 1995); Berlin, 858 F.2d at
1163-64.
135 Globes, supra note 34, at 225-26.
136 Bintz, supra note 4, at 998.
137 919 F.2d 747, 752 (D.C. Cir. 1990). For two other cases supporting this broad
duty of individualized disclosure, see Anweiler v. American Electric Power Service Corp., 3
F.3d 986, 992 (7th Cir. 1993), and Bixler v. Central Pennsylvania Teamsters Health &
Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292, 1298 (3d Cir. 1993).
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Eddy involved a plaintiff who was diagnosed as HIV-positive and
developed symptoms of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS) for which exploratory surgery was scheduled on September
14, 1987.138 Meanwhile, his employer terminated the employer-spon-
sored group health policy on September 10, 1987.139 Prior to the ex-
piration of the policy, Eddy telephoned Colonial Life and asked about
his right to "continue" his coverage, but not about his "conversion
rights."140 However, the insurance company failed to explain to Eddy
his option of "converting" his group policy into an individual
policy.141
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that once Eddy
explained his situation, Colonial Life had a fiduciary duty to do more
than avoid providing misinformation. 142 Rather, Colonial Life had an
affirmative obligation "to convey to Eddy complete and correct mate-
rial information as to his status and his conversion options."143 This
duty could not be avoided by the technicality that the plaintiff in-
quired about "continuation" rather than "conversion" rights.144
The Court of Appeals provided a broad justification for this deci-
sion with an expansive concept of fiduciary duties in providing infor-
mation about current plans or options. Since "the duty to disclose
material information is the core of a fiduciary's responsibility," the
court found that "a fiduciary has a duty not only to inform a benefici-
ary of new and relevant information as it arises but also to advise him
of circumstances that threaten interests relevant to the relation-
ship."145 This general principle creates such a broad standard for in-
dividualized disclosure that one commentator characterized it as "an
138 Eddy, 919 F.2d at 748.
139 1&.
140 Id at 749. Eddy did not have a right to continuation of coverage under
COBRA, Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L No. 99-
272, 100 Stat. 82 (codified in scattered titles and sections of U.S.C.), because continu-
ation coverage does not have to be offered if an employer terminates all of its group
health plans. Because Eddy's employer terminated its only group health plan, Eddy
was not entitled to continued coverage.
141 Eddy, 919 F.2d at 749. There was a factual dispute at the district court level
about whether Eddy inquired about conversion rights or continuation rights under
his policy. Id.
142 Id. at 752.
143 M.
144 Interestingly, the appellant only alleged a breach of fiduciary duties by misin-
formation and never actually made the argument that the fiduciary standards of
ERISA encompass a fiduciary duty to provide individual disclosure. Se Bintz, supra
note 4, at 1002 n.103.
145 Eddy, 919 F.2d at 750.
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immense burden.., placed upon fiduciaries of plans covering a large
number of employees and the sponsors of such plans."'1 46
. Other cases have followed the general principles of Eddy in find-
ing fiduciary duties to provide individualized disclosure.147 For in-
stance, the Third Circuit explicitly adopted the Eddy approach of
individualized fiduciary disclosure in Bixler v. Central Pennsylvania
Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund.148 The court in Bixler adopted the
language from Eddy holding there is a fiduciary obligation to convey
complete and accurate information, even when such information
comprises elements that were not specifically inquired about.149 The
court repeated the mantra of an "affirmative duty to inform when si-
lence might be harmful," noting that full disclosure requires provid-
ing all material information relevant to the circumstances.15 0
These decisions run contrary to previous case law suggesting lim-
ited informational duties beyond the specific disclosure requirements
of ERISA. 151 For instance, in Howard v. Gleason Corp., the widow of the
defendant's former employee sued because the defendant failed to
inform her husband of his right to convert his group life insurance
coverage into an individual policy. 152 She contended that this duty
arose when Gleason Corp. sold off the subsidiary for which her hus-
146 Bintz, supra note 4, at 998. Bintz proposes a narrow interpretation of this rul-
ing that the fiduciary is responsible to provide individualized disclosure to partici-
pants and beneficiaries only in responding to specific factual inquiries concerning the
terms or operation of a plan. Id. at 1003. The alternative, a free-standing affirmative
duty to provide individualized disclosure at the employer's own initiative, seems im-
practical given the hopeless number of details an employer would be required to keep
track of for individual employees. Id. at 1003-04 n.108.
147 See Bixler v. Cent. Pa. Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292, 1298
(3d Cir. 1993); Anweiler v. Am. Elec. Power Sent. Corp., 3 F.3d 986, 992 (7th Cir,
1993).
148 12 F.3d at 1300.
149 Id.
150 Id. The Seventh Circuit made a similar ruling in the same year that Bixter was
decided, echoing the language from Eddy and holding there is a fiduciary duty to
disclose material facts affecting interests of beneficiaries regardless of whether he or
she asked for the information. See Anweiler, 3 F.3d at 991-92. This duty of providing
material information might not necessarily involve informing beneficiaries of possible
options, but simply a duty of clarity in informing the beneficiary on how the employer
interprets the plan. See Chiles v. Ceridian Corp., 95 F.3d 1505, 1511 (10th Cir. 1996).
151 See, e.g., Howard v. Gleason Corp., 901 F.2d 1154, 1158 (2d Cir. 1990); Stahl v.
Tony's Bldg. Materials, Inc., 875 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 1989); Schultz v. Metro.
Life Ins. Co., 872 F.2d 676, 679 (5th Cir. 1989); Cummings v. Briggs & Stratton Ret.
Plan, 797 F.2d 383, 387 (7th Cir. 1986); Childers v. N.W. Airlines, Inc., 688 F. Supp.
1357, 1361 (D. Minn. 1988); Hopkins v. FMC Corp., 535 F. Supp. 235, 239 (W.D.N.C.
1982); Allen v. Ad. Richfield Ret. Plan, 480 F. Supp. 848, 851 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
152 901 F.2d at 1156.
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band worked. 153 The group life insurance terminated at the time of
the sale because he was no longer an employee of Gleason Corp., and
thus his wife's claim for life insurance benefits was denied upon his
death. 54 The Second Circuit denied the claim because the defendant
fifilled all of ERISA's express requirements and also provided other
employee communications which clearly described available conver-
sion rights. 155
Some commentators have seized upon the broad language in the
Eddy opinion and other decisions finding this broad duty to provide
individualized disclosure' 56 as evidence of court decisions holding the
employer-fiduciary has a general duty of disclosure even in the ab-
sence of inquiry.157 However, while the language in Eddy, standing by
itself, could support this reading,1 58 the context was the provision of
information and options to a current participant of a current plan.
The court, then, was really making a pronouncement about the
breadth of the fiduciary duty to explain current provisions and op-
tions to a beneficiary, including outlining which options would be pre-
ferred in the situation facing the particular beneficiary. 159 The
relevant principle is individualized disclosure-relating all the possible
facts and options which are material and relevant to this benefici-
ary.' 60 To interpret these cases as providing a generalized fiduciary
disclosure duty and cite them as support for such duties in the case of
disclosing proposed benefit plans or changes is somewhat mislead-
ing.11 These cases reflect individualized disclosure duties of current
benefit plans to current participants. A fiduciary duty to disclose pro-
posed benefit or plan changes has little to do with individualized dis-
153 Id at 1155-56.
154 Id
155 Id- at 1161.
156 See supra note 147.
157 See Rotenberg, supra note 34, at 1929 n.54; see also Bany, supra note 6, at
756-60 (interpreting Eddy to provide a general disclosure duty).
158 The Eddy court pronouncement generally referred to is 'a fiduciary has a duty
not only to inform the beneficiary of new and relevant information as it arises but also
to advise him of circumstances that threaten interests relevant to the relationship."
Eddy v. Colonial Life Ins. Co., 919 F.2d 747, 750 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
159 The facts of Bixler also involve the failure to provide relevant information
about a current plan when the fiduciary had information which would lead it to be-
lieve the particular option was material. Bixler v. Cent. Pa. Teamsters Health & Wel-
fare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292, 1296 (3d Cir. 1993).
160 See Bintz, supra note 4, at 998; see also Bins v. Exxon Co., No. 98-55662, 2000
U.S. App. LEXIS 10980, at *28 n.10 (9th Cir. Aug. 10, 2000) (en bane).
161 See Barry, supra note 6, at 756; see also Rotenberg, supra note 34, at 1929 (not-
ing Eddy as a case mandating disclosure duties for proposed benefit changes).
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closure. Rather, it requires an independent analysis of both ERISA
statutory language and common law trust rules.
B. Fiduciary Duty to Disclose Proposed Plan or Benefit Changes
The Varity Court refused to address the issue of whether ERISA
obligates the disclosure of proposed plan or benefit changes to par-
ticipants.' 62 There has been considerable disagreement among the
lower courts dealing with disclosure of proposed benefit changes,16 3
but there has been a trend towards a "serious consideration" test as
triggering fiduciary disclosure duties in these cases. 164
The Sixth Circuit first formulated the "serious consideration" test
as a method of determining when a fiduciary's disclosure duties are
triggered to disclose proposed benefit or plan changes in response to
employee inquiry.165 In Berlin v. Michigan Bell Telephone Co., plaintiffs
alleged that they retired subsequent to an early retirement package
offering and were persuaded by management that no future retire-
ment packages would be offered.' 66 Subsequently, a second retire-
ment package was announced, and plaintiffs claimed that the failure
to disclose this proposed benefit change upon inquiry breached the
defendant's fiduciary disclosure duty. 6 7
The Sixth Circuit recognized that, while the decision to offer the
second retirement package was a discretionary decision of the em-
ployer, communications to plan participants about such an offering
might support a claim for breach of fiduciary duty.'6 The court held
that "there can be no misrepresentations about a future offering until
that point in time (a question of material fact) when serious considera-
tion has been given by the plan administrator and/or fiduciary concern-
ing the implementation of the plan.' 69 The court also noted they were
not imposing a "duty of clairvoyance" and requiring the employer to
predict accurately whether future changes or offerings would be
made.170
162 Nimtz, supra note 38, at 894.
163 Id. at 895.
164 See Clobes, supra note 34, at 226; see also Nimtz, supra note 38, at 894 (noting
the formulation of the serious consideration test).
165 See Berlin v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 858 F.2d 1154, 1164 (6th Cir. 1988).
166 Id. at 1156-60. Cases involving allegations of breach of fiduciary duties fre-
quently involve "retirement sweetener packages" such as this factual situation. See
supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
167 Id. at 1159-60.
168 See id. at 1163.
169 Id. at 1164 (emphasis added).
170 Id.
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While this decision may have introduced a fiduciary standard, it
did not provide any guidance about how one can determine when
"serious consideration" has occurred. The Third Circuit adopted and
expounded this test in Fischer v. Philadelphia Electric Co.1 7 1 The test
given by the Fischer court has been adopted by several other circuits
and best approaches a consensus on fiduciary disclosure duties for
proposed benefit changes in response to employee inquiries.17
The Fischer court began with a basic principle: plan administra-
tors cannot make affirmative misrepresentations to plan participants
about changes to an employee pension benefit plan. 173 In determin-
ing whether the misrepresentation was "material," the key factor vras
whether such change was under serious consideration.17 4 In the
court's opinion, the concept of serious consideration assisted in mod-
erating the tension between "an employee's right to information and
an employer's need to operate on a day to day basis."175
According to the court in Fischer, serious consideration occurs
when "(1) a specific proposal (2) is being discussed for purposes of
implementation (3) by senior management with the authority to im-
plement the change."17 6 The specific proposal prong separates the
mere evaluation of options and focuses on a proposal that is "suffi-
ciently concrete to support consideration by senior management."177
171 FscherII, 96 F.3d 1533, 1538 (3d Cir. 1996). This case was actually an anal)sis
of the application of "serious consideration" from a case that had already been re-
manded to the district court after the Third Circuit determined there was an issue of
material fact as to whether the defendant had made material misrepresentations to its
employees-beneficiaries. See Fischer v. Phila. Elect. Co., 994 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1994).
The facts of this case, as retold in Fsder II, involve the president and CEO of the
defendant, Philadelphia Electric Company, announcing in a letter dated April 19,
1990 plans to cut payroll through early retirement and suggesting employees consider
delaying retirement until the early retirement package was finalized. The plan was
approved on May 25, 1990. Various pre-plan retirees filed suit, alleging that the de-
fendant had long known of its intent to offer an early retirement package, or at least
that it was considering such a package, and had thus breached its fiduciary disclosure
obligations under ERISA by providing material misinformation. &e Fischer v. Phila.
Elec. Co. (Fischer II), 96 F.3d at 1533-38.
172 For other cases adopting a "flexible" version of the Fiscder test, see Vartanian v.
Monsanto Co., 131 F.3d 264, 272 (1st Cir. 1997), Hodwit v. Sun Co., 109 F.3d 1515, 1523
(10th Cir. 1997), Muse v. IBM Corp., 103 F.3d 490, 494 (6th Cir. 1996), Maez v. Moun-
tain States Telephone & Telegraph, Inc., 54 F.3d 1488, 1500 (10th Cir. 1995), and Barnes
v. Lacy, 927 F.2d 539, 544 (11th Cir. 1991) (using a modified form of the test).
173 See Fscher H, 96 F.3d at 1538.
174 Id.
175 Id. at 1539.
176 Id.
177 Id. at 1540.
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Discussion for implementation helps distinguish the process of simply
gathering data and allows senior management to participate in the
process without triggering the disclosure duty.' 78 Finally, the prong of
consideration by senior management focuses the test on those who
actually have the authority to implement the proposal, although it can
extend to those who have the power to make recommendations to the
board.179
In adopting this test, the Third Circuit described it as an attempt
to balance the considerations of all the involved parties, intended to
be flexible and fact-specific.' 80 Several of the circuits that have
adopted the three-pronged formulation have also emphasized the
fact-specific and flexible nature of the test.'8 ' While some courts com-
pletely reject fiduciary duties to disclose proposed benefit changes, 82
the Second Circuit has modified the serious consideration test pre-
cisely because it was not sufficiently flexible and fact-specific in exam-
ining the factual situations that determine whether such fiduciary
duties arise.183
In Ballone v. Eastman Kodak Co.,' 84 the Second Circuit became the
first circuit to seriously modify the three-pronged serious considera-
tion test promulgated by the Fischer court.'85 The court below had
grantedjudgment to the defendants because it believed there was no
serious consideration. 186 The Second Circuit rejected the idea that
"serious consideration" is a prerequisite to finding such misrepresen-
tations material. 187 Instead, the court found that serious considera-
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 Id. at 1540-41.
181 See, e.g., Hockett v. Sun Co., 109 F.3d 1515, 1523-24 (10th Cir. 1997).
182 See, e.g., Porto v. Armco Inc., 825 F.2d 1274, 1276 (8th Cir. 1987).
183 See Ballone v. Eastman Kodak Co., 109 F.3d 117, 123 (2d Cir. 1997).
184 Id. This case involved plaintiffs who filed suit against Eastman Kodak, alleging
that Kodak breached its fiduciary duty by making misrepresentations that led retirees
to believe that no enhanced pension plan would be offered in the months following
their retirement. In particular, the plaintiffs asserted that Kodak told them no retire-
ment packages would be offered during the current year, yet such a plan was an-
nounced in mid-August of 1991, shortly after the plaintiffs left the company. Id. at
117-20.
185 See Barry, supra note 6, at 754; cf. Bins v. Exxon Co., No. 98-55662, 2000 U.S.
App. LEXIS 10980, at *29 (9th Cir. Aug. 10, 2000) (en banc) (describing a
modification).
186 See Ballone, 109 F.3d at 121 (citing Mullins v. Pfizer, 23 F.3d 663, 669 (1994)).
The court interpreted statements in Mullins to indicate that, as more serious consider-
ation is given to ERISA plan changes, the misrepresentation becomes more material.
See id.
187 See id. at 124.
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tion was but one factor in the "materiality" inquiry about alleged
misrepresentations.18 8 Thus, the Second Circuit rejected serious con-
sideration as a "talismanic indicator," in favor of a broader fact-based
examination that seeks to discover whether the misrepresentation
would mislead the reasonable employee.'8 9 The court noted that this
decision was in line with the Varity decision that a fiduciary has a duty
not to make affirmative misrepresentations.190
There are several important points about the Ballone decision.
The Balone ruling itself only deals with affirmative misrepresentations
in the context of proposed ERISA plan changes. This ruling does not
necessarily constitute an opinion about employer silence in response
to employee inquiries about proposed plan changes. It simply restates
the rule from Varity that an employer-fiduciary can never make affirm-
ative misrepresentations to a beneficiary. 19' Second, the broad mate-
riality inquiry created by Ballone could possibly be stretched (by those
who are more employer-oriented) to reach more conservative results
than the three-pronged analysis of Fischer It would be a mistake to
assume that the materiality inquiry is always an expansion of fiduciary
duties.' 92
Finally, it is significant that none of these landmark cases ad-
dresses the fiduciary duty to disclose proposed benefit changes in the
absence of employee inquiry.193 In fact, previous to Bins, the Second
and the Fourth Circuits both addressed the question of disclosure of
proposed benefit changes in the absence of employee inquiry, and
both decided there 'was no fiduciary disclosure duty in such in-
stances. 94 While some commentators have attempted to construe a
later Second Circuit case, Becker v. Eastman Kodak Co.,195 as "eviscerat-
ing" Pocchia v. Nynex Corp.,' 96 the prior Second Circuit case, and other
limitations on disclosure duties, 97 this analysis misconstrues the Becker
188 Id at 123-24.
189 Id.
190 Id at 124; see supra notes 106-09 and accompanying text.
191 See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
192 But see Barry, supra note 6, at 760-61 (indicating that Ballone represents an
expansion of fiduciary duties).
193 This is the topic which Bins, 189 F.3d 929, 954 (9th Cir. 1999), addresses in its
adoption of the serious consideration test.
194 SeePocchiav. Nynex Corp., 81 F.3d 275, 279 (2d Cir. 1996); Stanton v. Gulf Oil
Corp., 792 F.2d 432, 435 (4th Cir. 1986).
195 120 F.3d 5 (2d Cir. 1997).
196 81 F.3d 275 (2d Cir. 1996).
197 Barry, supra note 6, at 759-60.
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case. s98 Becker is more in line with the individualized disclosure cases
of current benefit plans, because it involves an employee benefit coun-
selor who failed to provide material information when she knew of the
employee's circumstances. 199
V. IMPOSING AEFIRMATIVE DISCLOSURE DuTIEs OF PROPOSED BENEFIT
CHANGES IN THE ABSENCE OF EMPLOYEE INQUIRY
The panel decisions in Bins v. Exxon Co.2 00 and Wayne v. Pacific
Bell Corp.201 represent pronouncements of Ninth Circuit panels im-
posing affirmative fiduciary duties to disclose proposed benefit
changes. The Ninth Circuit adopted the serious consideration test in
Bins,202 with the gloss adopted by the Second Circuit in Ballone.203
However, the Ninth Circuit panel went beyond other circuits in ad-
dressing fiduciary disclosure duties for proposed changes to ERISA-
covered plans. The court became the first to hold that employer-fidu-
ciaries have an affirmative duty to disclose such proposed changes to
198 Becker involved an employee who became eligible on January 1, 1990 for an
early retirement incentive package, paying retirement benefits in the form of an an-
nuity. Kodak announced in August, 1990 that employees would have the option of
choosing between an annuity or a one-time lump-sum payment in taking their retire-
ment benefits. After Becker became ill, she went to an employee benefits counselor
in April, 1990, who advised her to take long-term disability rather than retirement
without mentioning the possibility of retiring with the lump-sum benefit. Becker's
health deteriorated, and she was informed about the lump-sum option too late (in
October, 1990), for she died three days before the date on which she w, to receive
the lump-sum payment (November 1). This was because the plan would not allow a
retroactive retirement. Becke, 120 F.3d at 5-10.
199 See id.
200 189 F.3d 929 (9th Cir. 1999).
201 189 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 1999). The decision was decided the same day as the
Bins decision.
202 For a description of the serious consideration test, see Fischer v. Philadelphia
Electric Co. (Fischer H), 96 F.3d 1533, 1538-40 (3d Cir. 1996). For circuits that have
adopted the serous consideration test for disclosure of proposed benefit changes, see
Vartanian v. Monsanto Co., 131 F.3d 264, 272 (1st Cir. 1997), Hockett v. Sun Co., 109
F.3d 1515, 1523 (10th Cir. 1997), Muse v. IBM Corp., 103 F.3d 490, 494 (6th Cir.
1996), Maez v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph, Ina, 54 F.3d 1488, 1500 (10th
Cir. 1995), and Barnes v. Lacy, 927 F.2d 539, 544 (11th Cir. 1991).
203 109 F.3d 117, 120-24 (2d Cir. 1997). The Ballone court followed the Supreme
Court's pronouncement in Varity that a fiduciary can never make affirmative misrep-
resentations about benefit plans to its beneficiaries/participants. See supra notes
106-09 and accompanying text. In examining when such fiduciaries are liable for
such misrepresentations, Ballone decided that the basic test was the materiality of such
misrepresentations judged by the totality of the circumstances. Serious consideration,
in the Ballone court's judgment, was only one factor in this materiality inquiry. See id.
at 120-24.
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its employee-beneficiaries, even in the absence of employee inquiy.2 4
While this decision has since been reversed by the Ninth Circuit en
banc,2 0 5 the original panel decision has laid the theoretical ground-
work which may be followed by other circuits which have not ad-
dressed the issue.
A. The Facts Giving Rise to Bins
Bins involved the scenario of a "retirement sweetener package,"
intended to create financial incentives for employees to retire, which
was not disclosed to certain employees before they retired.20 6 The ap-
pellant, Ernest S. Bins, worked for Exxon U.S.A., a division of Exxon
Corp., for fifteen years and had attempted to confirm rumors of a
possible lump-sum retirement incentive before his planned retire-
ment onjanuary 1, 1996.207 Bins heard rumors throughout the fall of
1995 that a lump-sum retirement incentive would be offered by Exxon
through its Special Program of Severance Allowances (SPOSA).20- He
attempted to confirm this rumor by speaking to personnel in a posi-
tion to know and provide information about this type of offering.20 9
This included his direct supervisors, his assigned benefit counselor,
and a human resources advisor, all of whom informed him they had
no knowledge of such a planned SPOSA offering.210
Because of these SPOSA rumors and his desire to avoid a penalty
for early withdraval from his Thrift Account, Bins delayed his retire-
ment to February 1, 1996.211 In November, 1995, he attended a retire-
ment seminar conducted by an Exxon attorney, who also denied any
knowledge of a SPOSA offering.212 Bins's last attempt to uncover in-
formation about a SPOSA offering came at his retirement party on
204 Bins v. Exxon Co., No. 98-55662, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 10980, at *29 (9th Cir.
Aug. 10, 2000) (en banc). Some commentators feel that the Eddy decision from the
D.C. Circuit already made such a ruling. See Barry, supra note 6, at 756-57; see also
Rotenberg, supra note 34, at 1929 n.54 (noting Eddy as a case expanding disclosure
duties to proposed benefit changes).
205 Bins, No. 98-55662, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 10980, at *29.
206 For a discussion of the prevalence of 'retirement sweetener" plans in proposed
benefit changes litigation, see supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text The com-
panion case, Iayne v. Pacyfik Be Corp., 189 F.d 982 (9th Cir. 1999), also involved the
non-disclosure of retirement "sweetener" packages to employees who had previously
inquired before such a plan reached "serious consideration."
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December 27, 1995, where his "supervisor's supervisor" denied knowl-
edge of a SPOSA offering.213 On February 13, 1996, two weeks after
Bins's retirement, Exxon U.S.A. publicly announced the availability of
SPOSA benefits.21 4
On the management side, an "Organization Effectiveness Study"
(OES) team submitted proposals in December, 1995 and January,
1996 to Exxon U.S.A. senior management that suggested offering in-
creased benefits under the SPOSA to induce early retirement of ex-
cess workers.215 The vice-president and manager of the affected
department, who was authorized to implement these proposals after
obtaining approval from Exxon, reviewed the proposals on November
29, 1995.216 An Exxon U.S.A. senior vice-president reviewed the pro-
posals on December 1, 1995, as did the company's president on De-
cember 15, 1995.217 These proposals were forwarded to Exxon Corp.,
where they were favorably reviewed by an Exxon senior vice-president
on January 11, 1996. The Exxon U.S.A. president conducted a final
review of the proposals on January 24, 1996, and the senior vice-presi-
dent formally approved the proposal on January 26. On January 30,
the Exxon U.S.A. human resources manager requested approval to
implement the proposed SPOSA offering on February 2 and received
this approval on February 5.218
While Exxon was reviewing the proposal on January 24, the
human resources operation manager sent a memo to members of the
department which gave legal guidance on how questions regarding
SPOSA should be answered. Personnel were instructed to respond to
such questions by referring to the SPOSA offering as "under review"
and not to initiate any SPOSA-related conversation with employees. ' 19
Even with knowledge of final approval, personnel and supervisors
were simply to respond with "an announcement is scheduled for (in-
sert portion of the month) ."220
B. The Ninth Circuit's Analysis of "Serious Consideration"
The court began its examination of the scope of fiduciary disclo-
sure duties for proposed benefit plan changes by noting that Varily
213 Id.
214 Id. at 933.
215 Id. at 932.
216 Id.
217 Id.
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held that the law of trusts informs such fiduciary duties.2' In particu-
lar, the court noted Varity's conclusion that "[tio offer beneficiaries
detailed plan information in order to help them decide whether to
remain with the plan" is part of the fiduciary role played by a plan
administrator.222 The court then looked to other circuits adopting
the "serious consideration" standard to determine when the likeli-
hood of offering a severance program must be communicated to par-
ticipants and beneficiaries.22 3 The court also realized, however, that
even the Fischer court believed that the analysis of this question is "an
inherently fact-specific review." 224 The flexibility of the "serious con-
sideration" test, according to the court, was essential "particularly in
cases that present evidence of an employer's 'deliberate attempt to
circumvent ERISA' by carefully patterning its conduct so as to evade
one of the three factors."22
The court then expressed agreement with the general principle
that serious consideration occurs when information about a proposed
change in plan benefits becomes material, but it disagreed with the
Fischer characterization of the test as a compromise between an em-
ployer's fiduciary duties and its profit-seeking role as a business.226
The Bins court instead saw the employer as having an objective, unam-
biguous duty. "The employer, when acting as a fiduciary, has an undi-
vided duty of loyalty to the participants and beneficiaries of the
plan."2 27 Along with this commitment to fiduciary duties for the em-
ployer, the court agreed with the Ballone test of "serious considera-
221 See id. at 934.
222 I& at 934 (quoting Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 503 (1996)).
223 Id. Serious consideration, as defined by the circuits adopting the test, means
the point at which there is a (1) specific proposal (2) being discussed for purposes of
implementation (3) by senior management with the authority to implement the
change. See Fischer v. Phila. Elec. Co. (Fischer II), 96 F.3d 1533, 1539-40 (3d Cir.
1996). The Fischer case also provides a lengthy e.xplanation of how these different
factors should be analyzed. Id.
224 Bins, 189 F.3d at 935 (quoting Fischer , 96 F.3d at 1539).
225 Id. at 936 (quoting Vartanian v. Monsanto Co., 131 F.3d 264, 272 (1st Cir.
1997)).
226 See id. (citing Fischer I, 96 F.3d at 1539). The court also cited a recent Sixth
Circuit case recognizing an ERISA fiduciary's affirmative duty to inform participants
and beneficiaries of the existing provisions of an ERISA plan. Essentially, this
amounts to a duty of individualized disclosure. See Krohn v. Huron Mem. Hosp., 173
F.3d 542, 548 (6th Cir. 1999).
227 Bins, 189 F.3d at 936. The court cited Varity for support of this proposition.
Id. "A fiduciary must discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest
of the participants and beneficiaries." Variy, 516 U.S. at 506.
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tion" being the "starting point for assessing materiality."228 Rather
than giving talismanic significance to a strict formula for determining
when serious consideration has occurred, Bins emphasized a flexible,
factual inquiry looking at whether "the employer has violated its duty
of loyalty... by failing to disclose material information, making mis-
leading statements, or otherwise putting its business goals ahead of its
fiduciary obligations."229
C. The Affirmative Duty of Disclosure
The court began its analysis of affirmative disclosure duties by
making reference to a Ninth Circuit decision upholding a broad fidu-
ciary duty to provide individualized disclosure. 23 0 The court regarded
the possible affirmative fiduciary duties to provide information con-
cerning a proposed amendment to an ERISA plan as related to the
question of individualized disclosure. 23' The court noted the posi-
tions other circuits had taken on the duty to disclose a proposed
change in benefits, including the circuits which had adopted the seri-
ous consideration test, but declined to address the "affirmative duty"
question.23 2 Bins recognized that other courts had addressed the is-
sue of affirmative duty to disclose proposed changes in the absence of
employee inquiry and found no basis upon which to impose fiduciary
duties. 233
After examining all of these decisions,234 the Bins court an-
nounced, "once an ERISA fiduciary has material information relevant
228 Bins, 189 F.3d at 937. The court also discussed the mild modification of the
Sixth Circuit, which combines the Third Circuit three-pronged approach with the
overall qualification that serious consideration is "when a company focuses on a par-
ticular plan for a particular purpose." Id. at 939 (quoting Muse v. IBM Corp., 103
F.3d 490, 494 (6th Cir. 1996)).
229 Id. at 937
230 Id. at 938; see Barker v. Am. Mobil Power Corp., 64 F.3d 1397, 1403 (9th Cir.
1995) ("[A]n ERISA fiduciary has an obligation to convey complete and accurate in-
formation material to the beneficiary's circumstance, even when a beneficiary has not
specifically asked for the information."). The court has recognized that this duty can-
not extend so as to contradict or supplant provisions of ERISA. See Acosta v. Pac.
Enters., 950 F.2d 611, 618-19 (9th Cir. 1991).
231 See Bins, 189 F.3d at 938.
232 Id. at 939; see Vartanian v. Monsanto Co., 131 F.3d 264, 268 (1st Cir. 1997);
Hockett v. Sun Co., 109 F.3d 1515, 1525 (10th Cir. 1997).
233 See Pocchia v. Nynex Corp., 81 F.3d 275, 278 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Bins v.
Exxon Co., No. 98-55662, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 19080, at *28 (9th Cir. Aug. 10,
2000) (en banc) (rejecting affirmative disclosure duties); Stanton v. Gulf Oil Corp.,
792 F.2d 432, 435 (4th Cir. 1986) (same).
234 It is informative that the court did not even cite Eddy, 919 F.2d 747 (D.C. Cir.
1990), as precedent for the decision, lending justification for the interpretation that
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to a plan participant or beneficiary, it must provide that information
whether or not it is asked a question."235 Because the principle of
disclosing material information only applied in cases involving mate-
rial misrepresentations and in cases involving participants who inquire
about a proposed plan (under serious consideration), the court felt it
should extend to cases where the beneficiary fails to inquire about the
proposed plan.23 6 By penalizing employees who fail to ask the appro-
priate question, the court worried about discriminating against em-
ployees who work further from headquarters, or who would be less
likely to have access to informal sources of information.237
This result, according to the Bins court, was only the logical ex-
tension of the fiduciary duty to disclose material information to bene-
ficiaries. "[A] blanket disclosure rule appropriately requires the
employer to provide information about a potential change in ERISA
benefits to all employees who might be affected by such informa-
tion."238 While employers may wish to keep such information from
employees for business reasons, this general principle of disclosure
prevents concealment of such information as it becomes material.23 9
Recognizing the intuitive logic of a principle of general disclosure
from the common law of trusts, the Bins court saw no reason to re-
quire responses to questions from some employees, while allowing the
employer to remain silent to others.240 The court felt that such a duty
would not burden employers to the extent that it would discourage
the offering of employee benefit plans or enhanced benefits and ade-
quately protects an ERISA fiduciary from liability where there is no
reasonable knowledge the information was material.24'
Overall, the extension of disclosure obligations to create an af-
firmative disclosure duty for proposed benefit changes, even in the
absence of employee inquiry, rests on a theoretical basis. The Bins
court grounded the argument on the logic that there is a principle of
Eddy and its progeny really stand for duties to provide individualized disclosure. This
is despite the fact that the appellant Bins relied on Eddy in his brief. Bins, 189 F.3d at
939.
235 Bins, 189 F.3d at 939. The court restated this later in the opinion---"[O]nce an
employer-fiduciaxy seriously considers a proposal to implement a change in ERISA
benefits, it has an affirmative duty to disclose information about the proposal to all
plan participants and beneficiaries to whom the employer knows, or has reason to
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disclosure of material facts from the common law of trusts, and it
makes little sense to treat the inquiring employee differently from the
silent employee if the information is material to both. Finally, the
Bins court summarily dismissed practical and pragmatic objections to
this extension without much discussion-but these arguments were
much more persuasive to the Second Circuit and the en banc
panel.2 42
VI. PocCHIA v. Nwvax Comp. & Bns II: THE IMPRACTICALITY OF AN
AFFIRMATIVE DUTI TO DISCLOSE PROPOSED BENEFIT CHANGES IN THE
ABSENCE OF EMPLOYEE INQUIRY
The Second Circuit addressed the issue of fiduciary disclosure du-
ties for proposed benefit changes to participants of a particular ER-
ISA-covered plan in Pocchia.243 While the Second Circuit followed the
general consensus that a fiduciary may not mislead participants about
either an existing or proposed benefit plan,2 44 Pocchia adopted the
general rule that plan fiduciaries have no affirmative disclosure obli-
gations regarding proposed changes to ERISA-covered benefit
plans.2 45 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit sitting en banc reversed the Bins
panel decision, holding there were no affirmative disclosure duties in
the absence of employee inquiry.246 While the Ninth Circuit justified
its decision primarily on theoretical grounds resting on principles
from the common law of trusts, 247 the Pocchia decision relied on prac-
tical grounds and the legislative intent behind ERISA.2 48
A. The Facts Giving Rise to Pocchia
Anthony Pocchia worked for Nynex Corporation, or one of its
subsidiaries or predecessors, from May, 1965 to his resignation on May
15, 1989.249 Upon his resignation, Pocchia signed an agreement enti-
tling him to a lump sum payment of $28,500 and extinguishing cer-
tain claims Pocchia could raise against his former employer.25 0 Seven
242 See Bins v. Exxon Co., No. 98-55662, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 19080, at *29 (9th
Cir. Aug. 10, 2000) (en banc); Pocchia v. Nynex Corp., 81 F.3d 275, 279 (2d Cir.
1996).
243 81 F.3d at 278.
244 See, e.g., Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 506 (1996); Mullins v. Pfizer, 23
F.3d 663, 669 (2d Cir. 1994).
245 Pocchia, 81 F.3d at 278-80.
246 See Bins, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 19080, at *27.
247 See id. at *27-28.
248 See Pocchia, 81 F.3d at 278-80.
249 Id. at 277.
250 Id.
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months later, on December 21, 1989, Nynex announced an early re-
tirement incentive program, which would have given Pocchia en-
hanced benefits if he had retired under this plan.25 Pocchia
requested to be included in this plan in a letter dated January 22,
1990, but Nynex denied the request. 2 After this denial, Pocchia filed
suit against Nynex in April, 1990, alleging breach of the fiduciary dis-
closure duty by not informing him that Nynex was considering imple-
menting an early retirement plan.253
B. The Scope of Fiduciary Duties Under Pocchia
The Second Circuit began its analysis of the alleged breach of
fiduciary duty of disclosure by examining the vague language of the
fiduciary duties statutes codified in ERISA.2 4 Because the statute
does not enumerate or elaborate on the fiduciary duties owed to a
plan beneficiary, the Pocchia court recognized that courts have used
the common law of trusts to define fiduciary rights and obligations.25
While the court noted a general consensus about the duty of plan
fiduciaries not to affirmatively mislead beneficiaries, it reflected that
"the law is not well developed with respect to whether fiduciaries must
disclose plan changes that have been proposed and/or considered
but not yet adopted in the absence of a request for such informa-
tion."2 56 For instance, Judge Fernandez, the dissenter in Bins, read
the relevant precedent simply to mean "that upon inquiry the fiduci-
ary must volunteer all material information and cannot play 'scope of
the question' games."2 7 The court found no affirmative guidance in
such cases where the beneficiary simply believed he should have been
provided more information in order to make an informed decision




254 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1114 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
255 See Pocchia, 81 F.3d at 278.
256 Id. It is noteworthy that Poeehia did not even bother to address the "individual-
ized disclosure" cases as precedents for the decision. See gezerally Barker v. Am. Mobil
Power Corp., 64 F.3d 1397 (9th Cir. 1995) (requiring individualized disclosure); Bix-
ler v. Cent. Pa. Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292 (3d Cir. 1993)
(same); Eddy v. Colonial Life Ins. Co., 919 F.2d 747 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (same). How-
ever, Judge Fernandez does address these cases in his dissent in Bins and finds them
at the root involving misinformation about existing rights under an existing plan. See
Bins v. Exxon Co., 189 F.3d 929, 940 (Fernandez, J., dissenting).
257 Bins, 189 F.3d at 942 (Fernandez, J., dissenting).
258 See id. AsJudge Fernandez noted in Bins, the cases "do not speak to a require-
ment of sua sponte disclosure of information about a yet-adopted plan." Id.
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The court then reflected on dicta in Mullins v. Pfizer,25 - which
stated that ERISA fiduciaries are not expected to be perfect in predict-
ing what future changes in employee benefits will be offered, nor
should such fiduciaries be forced to disclose internal deliberations.260
Based on this line of reasoning, the court held that "a fiduciary is
not... required to disclose changes in a benefit plan before they are
adopted."26'
What practical concerns are there for adopting this policy? The
Pocchia court felt that insisting on voluntary disclosure during plan
formulation would increase the confusion of beneficiaries, especially
if such an amendment or change is not adopted. 262 At the same time,
management would be burdened with the confusion and uncertainty
of what to disclose and when to disclose it.263 The court also looked
past the uncertainties of the amendment process to the fact that such
pre-adoption disclosure could impair legitimate business goals.2 4 For
instance, a business seeking to reduce its workforce through an im-
provement of an early retirement or severance package would not fol-
low such a strategy if it were forced to disclose the strategy to
employees. Both the employer and beneficiaries recognize the fact
that in this instance, employees would not leave "if they were in-
formed that improved benefits were planned if workforce reductions
were insufficient."265
The Second Circuit also felt the imposition of affirmative disclo-
sure duties for proposed benefit plan changes could not be justified
by the legislative intent of ERISA. The Pocchia court cited the Fourth
Circuit's decision in Stanton v. Gulf Oil Corp.266 in support of the pro-
position that ERISA was not intended to safeguard the expectations of
employees in receiving early retirement benefits. 267 Rather, the pri-
259 23 F.3d 663, 669 (2d Cir. 1994).
260 See id.; see also Bins v. E-xxon Co., No. 98-55662, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 19080,
at *27-28 (9th Cir. Aug. 10, 2000) (en banc) (making a similar ruling).
261 Pocchia, 81 F.3d at 278. The court also relied on a similar ruling from the
Fourth Circuit as precedent. See id (citing Stanton v. Gulf Oil Corp., 792 F.2d 432,
435 (4th Cir. 1986) ("It is not a violation of ERISA to fail to furnish information
regarding amendments before these amendments are put into effect. This is so be-
cause the legislative intent of ERISA was not to assure the sanctity of early retirement
expectations, but to safeguard accrued retirement benefits.")).
262 See id.
263 See id.
264 See id. But see Bins v. Exxon Co., 189 F.3d 929, 939 (9th Cir. 1999) (reaching
the opposite conclusion).
265 Pocchia, 81 F.3d at 279 (citing Bintz, supra note 4, at 997).
266 792 F.2d 432 (4th Cir. 1986).
267 Pocchia, 81 F.3d at 278.
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mary intention of Congress was that "employees [would have] suffi-
cient information and data to enable them to know whether the plan
was financially sound and being administered as intended."-6 To im-
pose affirmative fiduciary disclosure duties for plans not yet adopted
would move further away from the "policy of 'encouraging the forma-
tion of employee benefit plans.'" 26 9 Permitting fiduciaries to remain
silent during pre-adoption deliberations and discussions does not frus-
trate this goal, but, as the court noted, it protects the interests of bene-
ficiaries at the earliest point when their rights can be affected. °0
Fiduciaries, meanwhile, are only required to provide information
when it becomes complete and accurate.27'
The Pocchia decision rejecting affirmative disclosure duties of
proposed benefit plan changes rested on widely differing grounds
from the Bins en banc decision discussed below. The Pocchia court
found that such a policy was not within (and possibly contrary to) the
legislative intent of ERISA and had the practical effect of impeding
the legitimate business goals of employers. Furthermore, there were
no clear precedents for the imposition of this affirmative disclosure
duty in the absence of employee inquiry. In contrast, the Bins en
banc decision rejected affirmative disclosure duties on the distinct ba-
sis of being theoretically inconsistent to require the administrator of
the plan to act as both employer and fiduciary.2 72
C. The Bins En Bane Gloss on Affirmative Disclosure
The decision by the Ninth Circuit sitting en banc followed Pocchia
in rejecting affirmative disclosure duties for proposed benefit
changes. However, the case also gave more elaborate guidelines for
employers, which may serve as precedents for other circuits dealing
with complicated factual situations in the area of disclosure of pro-
posed benefit changes. The court addressed the particular factual sit-
uation where employees inquire about benefit changes and are given
a negative response because no consideration has occurred. The
court considered whether an employer has an affirmative obligation
to inform employees of benefit changes after serious consideration
has occurred.
268 H.R. REP. No. 93-533, at 1-5 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639,4649.
269 Bins, 189 F.3d at 943 (FemandezJ., dissenting) (quoting Pilot Life Ins. Co. v.
Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987)).
270 See Pocchia, 81 F.3d at 279.
271 See id.; see also Bins v. Exxon Co., No. 98-55662, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 19080,
at *25-26 (9th Cir. Aug. 10, 2000) (en banc) (agreeing with the Poedda mantra).
272 See Bins, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 19080, at *27-28.
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The en banc decision distinguished two separate situations, which
require different responses. If the employee inquiring had requested
to be kept informed of any changes in the status of a potential change,
and the employer provides assurances, then the employer has a fiduci-
ary duty to follow up with that employee. 275 This is because continued
silence by the employer "conveys an implicit message that no serious
consideration has occurred and that the employee will rely on that
silence to his or her detriment."2 74 In the second situation, the court
refused to impose such a reporting duty on employers who did not
provide such assurances. This refusal rested on the theoretical basis
as the court believed imposing a duty would "extend an ERISA plan
adminstrator's fiduciary duty beyond conveying truthful information
and any discretionary duties it had assumed, and thus would be incon-
sistent with Varity."275
VII. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
The decision of the Ninth Circuit panel in Bins-that there are
affirmative disclosure duties forcing employers to reveal proposed but
not yet adopted changes in benefit plans, regardless of employee in-
quiry-was a radical departure from precedent in expanding the
scope of fiduciary duties under ERISA. In fact, the decision to
broaden the scope of fiduciary disclosure duties under ERISA to this
extent contradicted two other circuits which had previously ruled on
the issue.276 While this decision was overturned by the Ninth Circuit
sitting en banc, the initial ruling may still persuade courts that have
not yet addressed the issue to impose affirmative disclosure duties.277
Imposing such disclosure duties, while seeking to protect the in-
terests and expectations of employee-beneficiaries, unduly burdens
employers and creates the impractical result of forcing employers to
reveal internal deliberations and discussions. One can see that offer-
ing improved retirement severance packages, for instance, will no
longer be a practical option for companies that follow the affirmative
disclosure formulation. If a company wishes to reduce its workforce
by offering "sweeter" retirement incentives, they will need to conduct
an actuarial and statistical review of this proposal. Because the Ninth
Circuit refused to limit the standards by which such proposals are
273 See id.
274 Id.
275 Id. at *30-31.
276 See Pocchia, 81 F.3d at 279; Stanton v. Gulf Oil Corp., 792 F.2d 432, 436 (4th
Cir. 1986).
277 See Bins, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 19080, at *27-28.
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under "serious consideration," the fiduciary duty to disclose such pro-
posals is a "fact-specific" determination.27 8 The intelligent employer
will wish to avoid possible lawsuit liability and thus disclose any consid-
eration of such a proposal to all employees as soon as there is any sort
of concrete, substantive plan. Upon learning of the retirement "sweet-
ener" proposal, aU employees considering retirement will then delay
their decision in hopes of taking advantage of the financially advranta-
geous proposal. Thus, the proposal to offer early retirement incen-
tives might perhaps have an adverse short-term effect upon employers
attempting to reduce their workforce, and it could possibly give rise to
more litigation about misrepresentation if the employer decides to of-
fer the "sweetener."
The broad fiduciary affirmative disclosure standards, along with
nebulous, fact-specific criteria for determining when possible changes
are "material," create serious burdens on the ability of an employer to
make flexible judgments and business decisions. Because of these
burdens, employers in the Ninth Circuit may have been less likely to
offer improved benefits or options under benefit plans, if the panel
ruling had not been overturned. The complex and ambiguous stan-
dards about disclosure would not have created an atmosphere condu-
cive for employers to decide to offer new benefit plans that are
covered by ERISA. Thus, the affirmative disclosure policy, as the dis-
sent in Bins noted,27 9 is contrary to the basic ERISA purpose of "en-
couraging the formation of employee benefit plans."2 80
Imposing such a broad and ambiguous fiduciary standard upon
employer-fiduciaries would be understandable if there were ample
precedent from case law and the standard was justified by the legisla-
tive intent of ERISA. However, in this case, neither is true. While
some commentators have referred to the Eddy decision as the basic
precedent for affirmative disclosure duties of proposed benefit plans
in the absence of employee inquiry,28 1 the Eddy case and its prog-
eny28 2 clearly stand for a duty of individualized disclosure of material
278 Id
279 Bins v. Exxon Co., 189 F.3d 929, 939, 941 (9th Cir. 1999) (Fernandez, J.,
dissenting).
280 Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 54 (1987).
281 See Barry, supra note 6, at 762 n.172-73. In addition, Barry's analysis makes no
distinction between disclosure duties in the face of inquiry and in the absence of
employee inquiry. Id. at 762-65; see also Rotenberg, supra note 34, at 1929 n.54 (not-
ing Eddy as generally giving affirmative disclosure duties in the absence of employee
inquiry).
282 See, e.g., Bixler v. Cent. Pa. Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund, 12 F.3d 1292,
1296 (3d Cir. 1993); Anweiler v. Am. Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 3 F.3d 986,991 (7th Cir.
1993); Drennan v. Gen. Motors Corp., 977 F.2d 246, 252 (6th Cir. 1992).
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facts relating to a current benefit plan.283 This distinction might have
been the reason why the Bins panel did not even cite Eddy in its opin-
ion, despite the fact that it was cited as precedent in appellant Bins's
brief.284 The decision imposed this duty with no substantial prece-
dents, even though two other circuits had given contrary rulings on
such a duty.28 5 The en banc reversal by the Ninth Circuit noted the
weight of opinion to limit disclosure duties in its opinion.285
While not having much support in case law, the broad fiduciary
standards advocated by the Bins panel have no foundation in the legis-
lative intent of ERISA as well. The main purpose of an ERISA disclo-
sure requirement was to enable plan participants and beneficiaries to
know whether the plan was on solid footing and being administered
properly.28 7 The Pocchia decision reiterated this point by citing nu-
merous decisions which pointed out this very basic purpose of the dis-
closure requirement. 288 The imposition of affirmative disclosure
duties is no longer simply trying to protect beneficiaries, but rather
attempting to protect expectation interests of employees in the possi-
bility of enhanced benefit changes.
Consider employee X, who discovers through the Ninth Circuit
ruling that his employer-fiduciary is considering offering a "retire-
ment sweetener" to decrease excess middle management. X delays his
already planned retirement in order to take advantage of the en-
hanced plan benefit. While X has done nothing wrong, are the fiduci-
ary protections of ERISA intended to codify his right to have
knowledge of such possible benefit increases? As Stanton notes, "the
legislative intent of ERISA was not to assure the sanctity of early retire-
ment expectations."289
283 For a discussion of this distinction, see supra notes 143-56 and accompanying
text.
284 See Bins, 189 F.3d at 929-40.
285 See Pocchia v. Nynex Corp., 81 F.3d 275, 278 (2d Cir. 1996); Stanton v, Gulf Oil
Corp., 792 F.2d 432, 435 (4th Cir. 1986). Barry has depicted Pocchia as being "eviscer-
ated" by Balloe, 109 F.3d 117 (2d Cir. 1997). See Barry, supra note 6, at 759. How-
ever, Ballone is really a case involving individualized disclosure and the duty to provide
material information about current plans, as well as the duty not to provide misinfor-
mation. See Ballone, 109 F.3d at 122-26. Barry seems to acknowledge this reading of
Ballone later in his discussion. See Barry, supra note 6, at 765-67.
286 See Bins v. Exxon Co., No. 98-55662, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 19080, at *28 (9th
Cir. Aug. 10, 2000) (en banc).
287 See H.IL REP. No. 93-533, at 1-5 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.CAN. 4639,
4649.
288 See Pocchia, 81 F.3d at 279. For a further discussion of the purpose of ERISA
and the motivating forces behind the statute, see supra note 2 and accompanying text,
289 Stanton, 792 F.2d at 435.
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Finally, while affirmative disclosure may provide a neat theoreti-
cal structure by creating a uniform analogy to the undivided loyalty
that a trustee owes the beneficiary at common law,' 0 it does not coex-
ist with the legislative intent that common law fiduciary duties must be
imposed "bearing in mind the special nature and purpose of em-
ployee benefit plans."291 In particular, there is a presumption against
imposing such a duty when it does not "dearly advance ERISA's goal
of protecting the interests of participants... and... encourag[ing]
the development of the private pension and welfare system. " -29
2
Along with the fiduciary duties employers often have as adminis-
trators of such plans, they also wear the "second hat" of making discre-
tionary decisions as the operators of businesses.- 3 Some of these
decisions may have direct or indirect negative consequences to the
possible benefits available under ERISA-covered plans, but are within
the employer's prerogative as business decisions. Imposing affirma-
tive disclosure obligations for proposed benefit changes in the ab-
sence of employee inquiry interferes with the basic right of the
employer to terminate, amend, or create various changes to a benefit
plan. In other words, such a broad disclosure requirement creates
such a large fiduciary "head" that the discretionary "hat" of the em-
ployer no longer fits.
The standard of fiduciary duties proposed by the original Bins
decision imposed an ambiguous disclosure duty that creates the possi-
bility of more litigation and fewer improvements to employee benefit
plans. In seeking to protect the interest of ERISA plan participants
and beneficiaries, the en banc decision recognizes that such duties
will foster employer uncertainty and inertia with respect to employee
benefit plans. While courts which have not yet addressed the issue of
affirmative disclosure duties in the absence of employee inquiry may
find imposing such duties to have appeal in theory, there are serious
practical consequences. Courts that impose such a duty unduly bur-
den employers and extend fiduciary duties beyond the legislative in-
tent of ERISA
290 Barry's analysis seems to stem from the uniform loyalty owed by a trustee at
common law. See Barry, supra note 6, at 763-65.
291 H.P. REP. No. 93-1280, at 302 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038,
5083.
292 Rotenberg, supra note 34, at 1926 n.39.
293 Id For a discussion of the "two hats" theory of the dual roles of the employer,
see supra notes 115-29 and accompanying text.
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